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Abstract
Rose, Fredric E., M. A., 1991 Psychology
The Effects of Imagery and Valence of Information on 
Improving Memory in Dysphoric College Students (111 pp.)
Director: Janet P. Wollersheim, Ph.D.
Much of the current literature regarding the effects of 
depressed mood on memory has revealed that depressed subjects 
evidence poorer recall on a variety of measures when compared 
with non-depressed subjects, and that the greatest amount of 
memory difficulty is for items of positive hedonic tone. 
Little research, however, has sought to identify methods of 
improving memory in this population as one aspect of treating 
depression. This study sought to compare a group receiving 
an imagery instruction set, a group receiving a cognitive 
instruction set, and a no-instruction control group as a 
means of improving memory in dysphoric college students for 
passages varying in item valence. The hypotheses of this 
study were that all groups would improve in memory due to a 
practice effect, that subjects in the imagery condition would 
recall more information than the other groups, and that the 
greatest amount of memory improvement from pre- to post-test 
would be for items of positive valence.
Ninety college students, identified as dysphoric on the 
Beck Depression Inventory, were randomly assigned to the 
three groups. Each subject was read a 640 word narrative 
passage about a person's day, and, after an interference 
phase of ten minutes, were asked to write down as much of the 
story as they could recall. Subjects in the imagery and 
cognitive conditions were then given training in using their 
respective memory techniques while the control group 
performed an unrelated task. All subjects were then read a 
second passage, and after a ten minute interference phase 
were again asked to write all that they could remember.
The data did not support the hypotheses of this study. A 
significant effect of material valence was found, however, 
such that all subjects tended to recall a greater number of 
negative items, followed by neutral items, and lastly by 
positive items. This finding was explained in terms of mood 
dependant memory. The results of this study, however, were 
confounded by a weak manipulation.
Points of discussion include methodological limitations of 
this project, possible explanations for the current findings, 
and suggestions for future research in the area of depression 
and memory.
Acknowledgement s
As this project comes to a close, I look back over its 
course and progress with a sigh of relief, and would like to 
acknowledge the contributions of the many people involved in 
its completion.
First, and foremost, I would like to thank Janet P. 
Wollersheim, Ph.D. for serving as the chair of my committee. 
Dr. Wollersheim's patience and guidance from beginning to end 
of this project has taught me lessons beyond those of. 
research —  how to be a competent professional.
I would also like to thank the other members of my 
committee, John R. Bradley, Ph.D., Nabil Haddad, Ph.D., John
C. Spores, Ph.D., and Charles Horejsi, Ph.D. for their 
contributions. Dr. Bradley served as committee chair while 
Dr. Wollersheim was on a short overseas assignment. Dr. 
Haddad, Dr. Spores, and Dr. Horejsi (who took over as outside 
committee member when Dr. Spores went on sabbatical) 
graciously served on my committee and were a pleasure to work 
with. Also deserving of thanks is James Walsh, Ph.D., the 
psychology department’s statistics guru who graciously lent a 
hand in the analysis of the data.
Finally, I would like to thank my wife Elizabeth, and my 
family, who's love, support, and constant urging kept me 
going when I needed it.
Fredric E. Rose
iii
iv
Table of Contents
Abstract....................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ..............................................  iii
Table of Contents............................................. iv
List of Tables  ............................................ vi
List of Figures.................................................vii
Introduction ........................... .......................  1
Memory Problems in Depression ...........................  4
The Use of Imagery in Memory Improvement...............18
M e t h o d .............................. ........................... 2 9
Overview.................................................. 2 9
Subjects................... _...............................30
Materials.................................................32
Procedure................................................ 33
Scoring of Responses ....................................  38
R esults...................................... ..................40
Stimulus Equality .......................................  40
Inter-rater Reliability ................................. 46
Scoring...................................................4 6
The Effect of Depression on Recall.................... 47
Memory Improvement ....................................  4 8
Manipulation Check ....................................  56
Discussion..................................................... 65
Conclusion............................................... 75
References..................................................... 78
Appendices..................................................... 84
A. "Bill' s D a y " .........................................84
V
B. "Susan's D a y " ....................................... 87
C. Practice Passage .................................... 90
D. Manipulation Check .................................  91
E. Debriefing Statement ...........................  92
F. Scoring Criteria for "Bill's Day"  ................. 93
G. Scoring Criteria for "Susan's D a y " .................. 102
Footnotes .  ......  Ill
vi
List of Tables
Table Page
1. Summary of Means and t-values for
Rated Elements of Stimulus Passages................... 42
2. Summary of Means and t-values for
Comparisons of Valence Elements Within
"Bill's Day"............................................. 43
3. Summary of Means and t-values for
Comparisons of Valence Elements Within
"Susan ' s Day"............................................ 44
4. Analysis of Variance of Recall Scores ................... 4 9
5. Summary of Group Means and Standard
Deviations for Recall Scores........................... 50
6. Summary of Means and Standard Deviations for
Recall Scores Across Pre- and Post-Tests............. 53
7. Incidence Table for Chi-Square Statistics
Evaluating the Effectiveness
of the Manipulation..................................... 57
8. Chi-Square Contingency Table of Subject
Reports of Willingness to Use the
Technique Again.......................................... 60
9. Unweighted Means Analysis of Variance
of Assistance Ratings................................... 62
10. Summary of Means and Standard Deviations for
Memory Technique Used by Subjects......................63
vii
List of Figures
Figure Page
1. Mean Valence Ratings for Story Elements .................  45
2. Mean Recall of Elements in Each
Valence Category .........................................  54
Introduction
The condition known as depression has been written about 
for nearly 2000 years, although in the earlier times it was 
known as melancholia (Beck 1967). Even then the symptoms of 
the condition were fairly similar to depression as it is 
known today. The past few decades, however, have added a 
substantial amount of data to the empirical literature 
concerning the disorder. In particular, Beck (1967) 
published his book asserting that depression is not a disease 
of affect, but of cognition. In other words, people's 
incorrect thoughts are what influence the onset and 
maintenance of depression, rather than one's emotions. The 
defining symptoms of depression are as follows: (a) a
specific alteration in mood, including sadness, loneliness, 
and apathy (b) a negative self-concept associated with self- 
reproaches and self blame, (c) regressive and self-punitive 
wishes (d) vegetative changes including loss of libido, 
anorexia, and insomnia and (e) change in activity level, 
either a retardation or agitation (Beck, 1967, p 6). The 
most important of the symptoms is what Beck refers to as the 
cognitive triad. The cognitive triad consists of negative 
thoughts about one’s self, one's experience, and one's 
future. Beck contends that it is these negative thoughts 
which cause and perpetuate the condition known as depression. 
The cognitive theory of depression has helped to advance the 
empirical study of depression.
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While there are many differing views concerning the 
causes and treatment of depression, Beck's theory has gained 
much appeal and a vast amount of the current research on 
depression has been geared towards investigating its 
validity. In a review of the more prominent theories of 
depression Blaney (1977) notes that while Beck's theory has 
many unique features, there is also a considerable amount of 
overlap with both Seligman's (1974, 1975) Learned 
Helplessness theory and Lewinsohn's (1974a, 1974b) Behavioral 
theory. In particular, some of the negative cognitions to 
which Beck refers appear to be the very ones which would be 
expected of someone in a state of learned helplessness.
Indeed, cognitions such as the sense of hopelessness that 
things will never change or get better are very similar to 
the hypothesized feelings one has in the state of 
helplessness proposed by Seligman. In addition, both 
theories consider individual perceptions of events to be very 
important.
Lewinsohn's behavioral theory maintains that it is a 
lack of response-contingent positive reinforcement that 
causes clinical depression. A person becomes depressed, 
according to Lewinsohn, because the environment contains few 
positively reinforcing events for the subject, and/or because 
the depressed individual, perhaps because of a lack of skill, 
infrequently makes those responses that would be positively 
reinforced. The main difference between the cognitive and 
behavioral theories is fundamental. Lewinsohn asserts that
3
the cognitive aspects of depression are "secondary 
elaborations of the feeling of dysphoria, which in turn is 
presumed to be the consequence of a low rate of [response- 
contingent positive reinforcement]" (Lewinsohn, 1974a, p.
169). In other words, Beck maintains that cognitions cause 
depression, while Lewinsohn claims that the cognitions are a 
result of the depression. However, Lewinsohn's theory states 
that "depressed individuals are more sensitive to aversive 
stimuli...than non-depressed subjects" (1974a, p. 165). This 
characteristic, however, may simply be a behavioral 
manifestation of the negative view of one's world to which 
Beck refers.
Beck's most important and unique contribution to the 
various theories of depression is his emphasis on particular 
cognitions that are not addressed by the others (Blaney,
1977). According to Beck, the cognitive triad is the root of 
a series of other cognitive symptoms that lead to depression. 
This list includes a low self-evaluation, negative 
expectations, self-blame and self-criticism, indecisiveness, 
and distortion of body image (Beck, 1967). Because the 
literature dealing with the validation of the theory is quite 
extensive, it will not be discussed here. Suffice it to note 
that Beck's cognitive theory of depression has generated a 
considerable amount of research and there exists considerable 
empirical support for many of his contentions (Blaney, 1977).
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Memory Problems in Depression
In recent years difficulties in memory have also been 
noted among depressed individuals (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 
197 9), and much of the current literature dealing with 
depression has been devoted to investigating these 
difficulties. There appear to be two main areas where memory 
deficits have been noted: (a) Memory in general, and (b)
memory for events (personal or otherwise) when the hedonic 
tone of the event is considered. With respect to the hedonic 
tone, it is unclear as to whether there is a heightened 
sensitivity to negative information, or a decreased 
sensitivity to positive information. This issue will be 
addressed in more detail later.
The degree of memory loss appears to be related to 
severity of depression (Johnson & Magaro, 1987; Fogarty 
Hemsley, 1983; Clark and Teasdale, 1982). The more severe 
the depression, the greater the tendency to recall negative 
experiences, while recall of positive experiences 
significantly decreases. In a review of the literature, 
Johnson et al. (1987) concluded that the self-schemata of 
mildly depressed individuals do not share the same pervasive 
negativity as that of more severe, clinically depressed 
patients. As Johnson et al. (1987) state, severity affects 
memory in depression " (a) by disrupting trace processing and 
storage by its disorganizational nature, and/or (b) by 
producing low levels of effort in encoding and storage."
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Fogarty and Hemsley (1983) presented depressed patients 
and non-depressed controls with a list of words on two 
separate occasions and asked them to recall a personal memory 
for each word on the list, and then to rate it for 
pleasantness. Because memories were taken on two separate 
occasions it was possible to study the effects of variations 
in mood on memory. Depressed subjects recalled significantly 
more unhappy experiences on the first assessment and 
significantly more happy experiences on the second assessment 
if an improvement in mood had also taken place.
Results of this study were also consistent with earlier 
research which demonstrated that depressed individuals 
recalled a significantly greater number of negative 
experiences than non-depressed controls. Fogarty and Hemsley 
concluded that "depression is most closely related to 
measures of unhappy memories while for the control group mild 
depression is related to measures of the accessibility of 
happy memories." In other words, mild mood fluctuation found 
in a normal population may result in decreased accessibility 
of positive memories, but larger variations in mood, like 
those noticed in the depressed patients by Fogarty and 
Hemsley, result in increased accessibility of negative 
memories. It has been hypothesized that at the onset of 
depression positive memories appear to be suppressed, but 
negative ones are not yet affected. However, because 
positive memories are suppressed, access to negative thoughts 
becomes easier. Easier access to negative memories assists
6
in perpetuating the depression, making negative memories more 
and more prominent, finally resulting in heightened access to 
negative cognitions and further suppression of positive ones, 
resulting in a vicious spiral into depression.
Fogarty and Hemsley have also ruled out the possibility 
that the effects of mood are on the categorization of 
memories, rather than on their accessibility. Independent 
judges rated the memories of both patients and controls for 
hedonic tone, and although the judges rated more moderately, 
in general they were in agreement with the subjects. It 
appears unlikely, therefore, that mood effects on 
categorization of memories can explain the effects noted in 
these studies.
Finally, Clark et al. (1982) presented depressed 
patients experiencing diurnal variations in mood with a list 
of words and asked them to recall a past real-life experience 
associated with each word. During the time of day when 
depression was worst, patients were more likely to recall 
negative personal memories than during the less depressed 
time of day. These authors also reported that the current 
hedonic ratings of the memory were more likely to be rated by 
the subjects as less positive (or more negative) than the 
original hedonic tone the more depressed a person was at the 
time they made the rating. Clark and Teasdale concluded that 
mood affects both the selection of emotional memories for 
entry into consciousness as well as how pleasing or upsetting 
those memories will be once they have entered consciousness.
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Other research has found that in addition to lower 
recall due to the effects of severity of depression, memory 
access, as assessed by speed of recall, is also affected 
(Lloyd & Lishman, 1975; Fitzgerald, Slade, & Lawrence, 1988). 
The Lloyd and Lishman (1975) study involved presenting 
depressed and non-depressed patients with a stimulus word and 
asking subjects to think of a personal memory associated with 
each word. The latency between the time of stimulus 
presentation and the time of memory retrieval was the 
dependant measure. Subjects who later showed an improvement 
in their depression were re-tested. Results showed that the 
ratio between speed of recall of unpleasant and pleasant 
memories decreased with increasing depression. These results 
appear to be a function of the degree of depression, as 
pleasant memories were recalled faster than unpleasant 
memories in less severely depressed patients, while the 
opposite was true for more severely depressed patients.
Fitzgerald, et a l . (1988) had dysphoric and non­
dysphoric college students estimate the frequency with which 
they experienced 20 (10 positive and 10 negative) affects. 
Subjects were shown cards containing these affects and asked 
to judge the frequency with which they felt they experienced 
them on a scale of 1 (never) to 9 (several times a day).
They were then presented with a card naming one of the 
affects and asked to think of a personal memory. Results 
indicated that dysphoric college students tend to estimate 
that they experience negative affect more frequently than
positive affect, while the reverse was true for non-dysphoric 
subjects. These investigators also found that dysphoric 
subjects recalled negative experiences faster than non­
dysphoric subjects when presented with a negative stimulus 
cue. Conversely, the non-dysphoric subjects recalled 
positive experiences faster than dysphoric subjects after a 
positive stimulus cue. The authors concluded that if 
memories are associated with a particular affect, and those 
memories are highly available, then the judged frequency of 
the subjective experience of that affect will increase.
A potential drawback of this study is that it is 
entirely possible that the dysphoric subjects actually dc 
experience more negative affect than non-dysphoric, and that 
these results are not simply a subjective interpretation 
based on memory availability. However, if the findings are 
based on memory availability the study lends support to a 
common finding in research on memory and depression: better
memory for negative information (and/or poorer memory for 
positive information) will tend to increase depression, 
strengthening the memory for negative information, resulting 
in the depressive cycle mentioned above. It is suggested 
that if negative memories are more easily accessed, than the 
judged frequency of the affect of dysphoria will increase, 
making the individual more depressed, or at least lowering 
hope of experiencing positive affect, resulting in more 
depression.
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Negative mood such as that found in depression does not 
appear to affect recall for negative information alone. In a 
review of the literature Ingram and Reed (1986) concluded 
that only pleasant and not unpleasant information appeared to 
be affected by mood. Several studies (Breslow, Kocsis, and 
Belkin, 1981; DeMonbreun and Craighead, 1977; Finkel, Glass, 
and Merluzzi, 1982; Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp, 1978; and 
Nasby and Yando, 1982) have all found a deficit in the recall 
of positively valenced material, relative to negatively 
valenced material. Breslow, et. al. (1981) used a story 
recall paradigm with hospitalized depressed patients.
Patients were read a story containing a mixture of positive, 
negative, and neutral elements and asked to write down as 
much of the story as they could remember after a 10 minute 
interval. Results revealed an overall deficit in recall for 
depressed subjects relative to controls, most of which was 
attributed to poorer recall of the positive themes in the 
story.
DeMonbreun et al. (1977) and Finkel et al. (1982) found 
that only when the stimulus is balanced towards positive 
information was there a distortion by depressed individuals 
in their perception of feedback. DeMonbreun et al. used a 
discrimination task that provided non-verbal feedback 
(different shades of black on a slide to indicate degree of 
acceptability of the response) to depressed patients.
Subjects were accurate in their perception of feedback 
immediately following presentation, but later underestimated
10
the amount of positive feedback received. In other words, it 
appears that the depressed patients, non-depressed 
psychiatric and non-psychiatric controls do not differ in 
their immediate perception of positive, negative, and neutral 
feedback. However, depressed patients, relative to the 
controls do tend to underestimate (distort) the amount of 
positive information actually received. This phenomenon only 
occurred when the subject had received a high rate of 
positive reinforcement. The distortion did not occur when 
the subjects received a low rate accompanied by a high rate 
of negative feedback. Similarly, Finkel et al. presented 
dysphoric and non-dysphoric college students with positive 
and negative self-statements. When the statement were 
primarily negative, no group differences in recall of amount 
of exposure were found. However, when the statements were 
primarily positive, the dysphoric group recalled being 
exposed to significantly fewer positive statements than 
controls. Isen et al. (1978, Study 2) and Nasby and Yando 
(1982, Study 1) found that induced depression resulted in a 
deficit in recall of pleasant words only. Teasdale and 
Fogarty (1979) on separate occasions induced depression and 
happiness in college students. They were then presented with 
a list of neutral words and were asked to recall either a 
real-life experience to be specified as either positive or 
negative, and to signal when they had thought of it. The 
amount of time taken to recall the experience was measured.
The ratio of latency of recall for retrieval of unpleasant
11
experiences to the latency of retrieval of pleasant 
experiences was significantly lower in the depressed 
condition than in the happy condition. This effect was 
largely due to an effect of mood on the retrieval of pleasant 
memories. Teasdale, Taylor, and Fogarty (1980) found that 
mood inductions resulted in differences that were significant 
for positive memories only.
Finally, Natale & Hantas (1982) got mixed results 
regarding the issue of better memory for negative information 
and lower memory for positive information. Those authors 
hypnotized subjects and induced a happy, sad, or neutral 
mood-state and provided them bogus personality descriptions. 
Later the subjects were presented with a list of personality 
descriptors and were asked to pick out the descriptors from 
the "personalized" list provided earlier. Results were 
consistent with the literature in that induced depression 
lowered memory for positive self-relevant information and 
showed an increased tendency toward false-alarm 
identification of negative descriptors. This study provides 
support for the notion that temporary mood states are 
associated with biased memory processes about the self. 
However, the study is not without problems. First of all, 
only female subjects were used solely because they have been 
found to be more susceptible than males to mood induction 
procedures. This selection procedure may have resulted in a 
biased sample. In addition, the mood induction procedure 
itself may have confounded the results. The use of different
12
types of mood induction procedures, such as the Velten 
procedure vs. hypnosis, may produce differences in the 
quality of the induced mood, making comparison's difficult.
There is the question of the validity of studies where 
moods themselves are induced. Blaney (1986), in a review of 
the literature on memory and depression, concluded that a 
major problem with mood induction studies using memory 
elicitation, hypnosis, music, and the Velten (1968) 
procedures is that these inductions contain the explicit 
instructions for the subject to try to feel the specified 
mood (the Velten procedure involves asking the subject to 
read a series of self-statements of increasing positive or 
negative hedonic tone, which guides the subject into the 
desired mood). As Blaney notes, subjects in an induced mood 
may be behaving because of the mood, or possibly because they 
were told to adopt and maintain that mood. It is natural for 
"normal" subjects to try and counter any negative feelings 
they begin to experience. However, because of the 
experimental instructions to feel a given mood, subjects may 
be actively trying to maintain the negative feelings any way 
possible, in this case by paying attention to fewer positive 
or more negative information. Mood induction procedures have 
their advantages, though, most notably because they allow 
direct experimental manipulation. The question the 
researcher must answer is whether or not something else might 
be going on because of the procedure used.
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Another common complaint in the current research on 
memory and depression is the lack of psychiatric controls to 
distinguish the effects of depression from the global effects 
of psychopathology. There have been a few studies, however, 
that have attempted to do this. Research by Gotlib (1981) 
investigated differences between depressed and non-depressed 
psychiatric inpatients>and normal controls with respect to 
their administration and recall of self-reinforcement and 
self punishment. Gotlib reported that in-patients did not 
differ in their administration of either punishment or 
reinforcement, although they did differ in their recall of 
amount and type of feedback. Both groups of in-patients 
administered significantly more self-punishments and fewer 
self-reinforcements than normal controls, but the depressed 
patients recalled giving significantly fewer reinforcements 
and more punishment than was actually the case. Gotlib 
concluded that while "a low-rate of self-reinforcement may be 
a characteristic of global psychopathology, deficits in the 
recall of self-reinforcement and self-punishment appear to be 
specific to depression" (emphasis added).
The results of the Gotlib (1981) study differ somewhat 
from a similar one by Nelson and Craighead (1977). Nelson et 
al. found that while depressed students recalled receiving 
more negative feedback than non-depressed students, they were 
more accurate in their recall than the non-depressed 
students, who tended to recall less negative feedback than 
was actually the case. The difference in these two studies
14
appears to be in the type of feedback given. Gotlib 
investigated self-administered praise and punishment, whereas 
Nelson and Craighead used feedback from an external source, 
the experimenter. It is therefore possible that depressed 
individuals tend to exhibit greater distortion on the recall 
of material that is more clearly self-referent; they subject 
their own thoughts to more cognitive processes than 
information from external sources, thus increasing the 
probability of distortion or faulty processing.
Roth and Rehm (1980) also used a non-depressed 
psychiatric control group in an investigation of self­
monitoring processes, memory, and depression. Subjects were 
asked to rate each word of a list containing 40 positive and 
negative adjectives as to how well each word characterized 
him or her. Next, subjects were asked to circle the ten 
positive and negative adjectives from the list that they felt 
best described them. Later subjects were asked to write down 
the 20 circled adjectives, and then were given a recognition 
test for those same 20 items. In contrast to the above 
study, these investigators found no differences between 
groups in their recall and recognition of personally relevant 
adjectives, although the recall scores were in the predicted 
direction of poorer performance by depressed subjects.
As a second task, the investigators presented subjects 
with 30 words, one at a time, and asked them to guess at a 
common associate of each word. The list of words was 
actually a list with ambiguous associates, and there were in
15
fact no correct or incorrect answers. Subjects received no 
immediate feedback concerning their responses, but when 
finished they were informed that they were "correct" on 
exactly half of their answers. They were then told that they 
could review some of their guesses, either correct ones or 
incorrect ones. The depressed patients tended to select the 
incorrect choices more than the non-depressed patients. 
Finally, the subjects were asked to rate a video of 
themselves on two dimensions, a positive one and a negative 
one. When ratings were compared to ratings of objective 
judges, both groups appeared to be poorer at self-monitoring, 
although depressed patients rated themselves as displaying 
significantly fewer positive behaviors and more negative 
behaviors than the non-depressed patients. Again, there 
appears to be some non-specific effect of psychopathology, 
although it cannot account for all of the effects shown in 
the literature.
Past research (Williams and Broadbent, 1986) suggests 
that the depressed individual's difficulties in accessing 
specific positive memories may be due to inefficient 
retrieval strategies, resulting in very general memories of 
time periods or repeated events, such as "My husband often 
fixes my car for me", or "We never had pets when I was a 
child." The research by Moore, Watts, and Williams (1988) 
provides further support to this claim. These authors asked 
depressed patients and non-depressed, non-psychiatric 
controls to recall a specific memory from stimulus sentences
16
varying in valence. If a subject's initial response was too 
general the experimenter would prompt the subject to give a 
more specific response. Results show that depressed 
patients' initial responses to all of the sentences were 
significantly more general than the controls' initial 
responses. In addition, there was a significant group x 
valence interaction, in that depressed subjects gave 
significantly more general responses to positive stimuli that 
could not be followed by a specific memory than controls.
There was no difference between groups for the negative 
stimuli. Depressed individuals, therefore appear to be able 
to generate specific memories for negative events, but have 
difficulty when the event is of a more positive hedonic tone.
Watts, MacLeod, and Morris (1988a) attempted to describe 
associations between phenomenal and objective aspects of 
concentration problems in depression. These authors 
differentiated concentration problems into "blank" lapses and 
"mind wandering" lapses, although they state that there are 
other types as well. The researchers were looking for a 
behavioral correlate associated with these two types of 
concentration lapses, as measured by a questionnaire and 
self-report during the various tasks (i.e.- subjects were to 
say "Lost it" whenever they found that they had lost 
concentration, and then "Yes" or "No" to indicate whether or 
not they had started to think about something else). They 
used two tasks, the 'Tower of London' task and memory for a 
prose passage. The Tower of London planning task involves
17
three different colored beads arranged on sticks of unequal 
length. The task is to move the beads to a target position 
in the minimum number of moves. There were 12 problems in 
all, requiring between two and fives moves each. The memory 
for prose task involved answering 10 questions about a 750 
word passage about a department store, which had just been 
read. Results indicate that blanking appears to be 
associated with longer planning times in the 'Tower of 
London' task, while mind wandering is more closely associated 
with poor memory for prose.
Watts et al. (1988a) offer the hypothesis that the 
amount of regulation of thought necessary to complete a 
particular task determines which type of lapses can occur. 
Problem solving requires that a series of stages be carried 
out sequentially, and generally utilizes the assistance of 
the Supervisory Attention System (SAS), a cognitive system 
that gives supervisory assistance to action systems that 
require it (Norman and Shallice, 1986). The SAS constructs a 
hierarchy of thoughts and assists in maintaining attention to 
the stages needing current attention. Watts et al. (1988a) 
suggest that when a depressed individual engages in problem 
solving the SAS is inhibited, causing lapses in concentration 
of the blanking type (for a complete discussion of this 
phenomenon see Norman & Shallice, 1986) . However, on memory 
for prose, switching from one stage to another is not 
required, making one susceptible to intrusions of other 
thoughts, or mind wandering.
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A simpler alternative hypothesis is simply the amount of 
cognitive effort required by the task. Problem solving 
presumably requires more processing effort than memory for 
prose, necessitating full attention to the task at hand 
(shutting down other thoughts). With the absence of other 
thoughts, lapses in concentration would take the form of 
blanking. In contrast, less effortful tasks like memory for 
prose fail to receive full attention by depressed subjects, 
resulting in mind wandering.
The cognitive model of depression (Beck, 1967) maintains 
that a depressed individual views the self, the environment, 
and the future in negative terms. It follows that if a 
depressed person has access only to negative events in 
memory, the negative views would tend to get worse, 
perpetuating the negative cognitions, resulting in a downward 
spiral further into depression. Better access to more 
positive life-events might therefore serve to disrupt this 
pattern.
The Use ■.■Of Imagery in Memory Improvement
Since access to more positive memories may aid in 
decreasing depression, cognitive therapy might be enhanced by 
incorporating techniques which assist depressed patients in 
accessing more positive memories. As Teasdale and Fennell 
(1983) state, "The general evaluation of cognitive therapy 
needs to be supplemented by more detailed investigations of 
specific component techniques." Watts, MacLeod, and Morris 
(1988b) have noticed that while techniques such as the
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structured assignments suggested by Beck et a l . (1979) are
commonly used, so far little research has paid attention to 
the improvement of memory in the cognitive therapy of 
depression. Watts et al (1988b) tested the use of a visual 
imagery processing strategy as a means of improving memory 
problems in depressed patients. Imagery was chosen because 
of the wide range of situations in which it can be used by 
patients, such as job instructions at work.
Watts, et al. (1988b) assigned depressed patients to one 
of two experimental conditions, imagery and relaxation, and a 
no-treatment control group. Subjects in the imagery 
condition were given training and practice in the use of 
imagery, while the relaxation subjects were given brief 
relaxation training. This latter group was used as a control 
for non-specific effects, while the no-treatment group was 
used to control for practice effects. All subjects were then 
read a 750-word passage aloud twice by the experimenter, who 
had given them the instructions to use the technique each had 
just learned to help remember it. The no-treatment group was 
simply told to "concentrate on it as well as you can."
Subjects were then immediately asked 10 questions testing 
their knowledge of the passage. Results of the study 
indicate that subjects instructed to use imagery recalled 
significantly more of the passage than those subjects given 
relaxation training as well as those given no instruction at 
all. These latter two groups did not differ from each other 
in amount of recall. Subjects with less state anxiety and
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those of less endogenous depression benefitted most from the 
technique, although anxiety was no longer a factor when 
endogeneity was partialed out. There was also a zero 
correlation between ability to visualize, as measured by the 
Verbalizer-Visualizer questionnaire. Thus, less endogenous 
depressed patients, irrespective of their tendency to think 
in words or pictures, appear to be able to benefit from 
imagery instructions to help improve memory.
There is a limitation to the Watts et al. (1988b) study 
however. The story used by these authors was purposely 
constructed to be neutral in content and of little interest 
(different sections of a department store). Their reasoning 
was to ensure that the story would fail to be encoded unless 
processing effort was made. While this is a valid concern, 
much of the current literature on depression and memory has 
noted that the difficulties in memory with this population 
tend to lie in either a heightened attention to negatively 
toned material, or a lower attention to positively toned 
material. Memory deficits, while still present, are least 
visible on material that is neutral in hedonic content. The 
imagery technique employed, therefore, may help memory in 
general, but it is unclear if it can improve memory for 
information containing positive and negative elements.
In addition, this study only controlled for non-specific 
techniques. The authors did not compare the imagery 
technique to other forms of memory improvement such as
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cognitive instructions. The current study is designed to 
investigate these questions.
There is a large amount of literature on the effects of 
imagery instructions on memory (see Alesandrini, 1982 for a 
more complete review). In one study, children remembered a 
passage better when they received imagery instructions 
(Kulhavy & Swenson, 1975). This effect was even more 
pronounced when practice was given prior to the instructions. 
Pressley (197 6) used third-graders in an experiment by giving 
them training and practice in either making up mental images 
along with examples of good pictures or in recalling story 
facts. A story was then read to each group. Children who 
had been given imagery practice were also given instructions 
to form mental images after reading each passage of the 
prose. Imagery practice and instruction proved to be better 
in facilitating memory for the story than the control 
students who received neither training or practice. Because 
both training and instructions were used together, it cannot 
be ascertained as to which was more effective, instructions, 
training, or a combination of the two. It does show, 
however, that imagery in general is superior to rehearsal in 
improving children's memory for prose.
Using expository text, however, DeRose (1976) failed to 
find the same effect. In this study fifth-graders were told 
to mentally imagine concepts presented in a social studies 
passage. These students remembered less than students who 
were shown actual pictures, and performed no better than a
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control group who received no instructions. This study only 
used the instructions to form images, without the aid of 
practice, suggesting that instructions alone may not be 
enough to facilitate memory, at least in children.
It has been suggested that a problem with trying to get 
learners to use mental imagery to improve reading retention 
is that reading tends to interfere with imagery because both 
use some sort of visual processing (Alesandrini, 1982). As a 
result, the use of imagery during reading may require more 
time if it is to be effective. Lesgold, Curtis, DeGood, 
Golinkoff, McCormick, and Shimron (1974) asked subjects to 
read a passage within a limited time period and were given 
instructions to use mental imagery. The authors found that 
while there were no overall benefits from the imagery 
instructions, adults who received the instructions tended to 
remember more from the first half of a passage than controls 
who received no instructions. These results suggest that 
imagery may be beneficial for learning, but requires more 
time. Other studies (Levin & Divine-Hawkins, 197 4; Brooks, 
1967) have found that both children and adults can benefit 
from the use of imagery during listening, rather than 
reading.
Attempts to use imagery strategies to improve memory 
performance of neurological patients (Powell, 1981, p. 124), 
blind subjects (Jonides, Kahn, & Rozin, 1975), and 
schizophrenics (Traupmann & Anderson, 1981) have met with 
some success. Until the Watts et al. (1988b) study, however,
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there appears to have been no attempt to use imagery to 
improve memory in depressed subjects.
In a review of the imagery literature, Alesandrini 
(1982) concluded that the use of imagery instructions can 
facilitate memory for a variety of people, although she 
states that pictorial strategies (strategies utilizing actual 
photographs or drawn pictures) and the use of concrete 
language (words readily visualized) are slightly more 
beneficial. One advantage of imagery instructions, however, 
is that the images used may be "idiosyncratic or bizarre", a 
condition considered by some memory experts to facilitate 
memory (Lorayne & Lucas, 1974).
There is growing evidence that imagery does have a 
clinical use in the treatment of depression, or moods in 
general (Means, Wilson, & Dlugokinski, 1987; Hart & Means, 
1985; Schultz, 1978). Schultz (1978) has noted that Freud 
and Abraham have used imaginal techniques to treat 
depression, although those techniques were of a 
psychoanalytic nature and involved long-term treatment.
Means et al. (1987) induced anger and sadness in two groups 
of subjects and compared the relative effectiveness of 
imagery and cognitive treatments to improve mood. Subjects 
were asked to remember a particular event in their life that 
made them feel either sad or angry. This memory was then 
used as a starting point for an Experimentally Induced Mood 
(EMI) procedure designed to produce the target mood. The EMI 
consisted of both imaginal and cognitive components for the
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subject to re-experience the mood from the memory. Subjects 
were then told to use first either a cognitive or an imaginal 
set of instructions (depending on experimental group) to 
change their mood within a 15-second time period. The EMI 
was re-administered and the other set of instructions was 
given. Results of the study showed that overall both methods 
were effective in mood reduction. However, when subjects 
used imagery prior to cognitive statements both methods were 
equally effective, but when statements were used prior to 
imagery, imagery proved to be more effective. The 
investigators concluded that "images are more effective in 
producing emotional change because affect and images are 
precognitively connected."
A potential drawback to this research is that it is 
unclear if the authors controlled for type of mood. Subjects 
were merely asked to "recall a situation in the past when 
they felt particularly sad or angry", but did not appear to 
specify or control for which type of mood was thought of. It 
is therefore difficult to conclude whether the investigated 
techniques improved the unpleasant moods in general, or 
either sadness or anger alone. In addition, the arguments 
against the use of mood inductions in general apply to this 
study. A no-treatment control group was not used, so it 
cannot be concluded that either treatment worked at all.
There is no indication that the EMI procedure used provided 
the researchers with any lasting mood. The re-experienced 
feelings may have simply dissipated in the short time
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following induction. A control group could have alleviated 
this problem.
Hart et al. (1985) compared imaginal and cognitive 
techniques to improve mood in relation to the specific 
etiology of the dysphoria. Dysphoria was induced in subjects 
in a hypnotic state by asking them to recall a sad or 
depressing event, followed by either cognitive or imaginal 
instructions to re-experience that event. Subjects were then 
given either an imaginal or a cognitive treatment involving a 
set of instructions to raise their mood. After 15 seconds 
subjects rated their mood. Results show that the cognitive 
treatment was only effective when the dysphoria was 
cognitively induced. Imaginal treatment was effective 
irrespective of type of induction. These results indicate 
that the use of imagery can have a positive effect on 
depressed individuals. Hart and Means caution the acceptance 
of the conclusion that imagery treatments are more effective 
than cognitive ones because of the 15 second time allowance. 
They note that it is possible that the cognitive treatment 
may require more processing time than the study allotted.
There is an alternate hypothesis to their results, however.
In the imaginal treatment condition instructions were given 
to "Sense how your body needs to feel and what it needs to 
do. Allow the things to happen to you that need to happen."
In the cognitive condition subjects were instructed to "Think 
through and integrate your knowledge in ways that are best 
for you in your situation. Keep thinking about what happened
and why you are sad." As one may notice, there is a 
difference in the types of instructions given (the two 
excerpts are only a sample, but they are representative).
The imaginal instructions appear to emphasize a moving 
forward and getting through the sad event, as if telling the 
subjects to settle the sad feelings to end the sadness.
Conversely, the cognitive instructions tend to emphasize the
sad situation, telling the subject to deliberate about it and 
why they feel they way they do. There is only minimal
emphasis on working through or getting past the feelings.2
It is possible that the difference in the instructions 
rendered the cognitive method ineffective.
Other research has noted that depressed patients do not 
benefit from imagery, although there are methodological 
problems with them. Hart, Kwentus, Hamer, and Taylor (1986) 
compared the performance of elderly Alzheimers patients, 
elderly depressed patients, and elderly controls on a verbal 
learning task. The list of words consisted of 6 words of 
high imagery value and 6 words of low-imagery value.
Depressed patients performed worse than the elderly controls, 
although better than the Alzheimer’s patients. There was no 
difference for the memory of low imagery value words between 
depressed and normal groups, but depressed patients tended to 
recall significantly fewer high-imagery-value words than 
normal. The authors' conclusion that depressed patients may 
be unable to use imagery to facilitate memory may be 
unfounded, however, because the study did not instruct
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subjects to use imagery. Depressed individuals' motivation 
to perform certain tasks is often low, and getting them to 
carry out these tasks may require explicit instructions to do 
so. The lack of benefit from imagery may be due to the fact 
that it did not occur to the depressed patients to use it or 
that it required too much cognitive effort to do so, rather
than an inability to use imagery.
It appears then, that memory can be facilitated by the 
use of imagery. There is also some evidence that imagery 
does have some effect on negative affect, particularly 
dysphoria. The current study is an attempt to clarify the
ability of imaginal techniques to improve the memory for
/
positive stimuli in depressed subjects. The imagery 
instruction technique will be compared with a more cognitive 
technique involving cognitive instructions.
There are three hypotheses in this study. The first is
that subjects in all groups will improve in the amount of
recall due to a practice effect. The second hypothesis is 
that subjects in the imagery condition will recall more 
information overall than the other groups because of the 
imagery technique’s presumed superiority as a memory aid. 
Finally, it is believed that the greatest reason for lower 
overall memory deficits in dysphoric subjects is due to a 
decreased ability to recall positive elements. Furthermore, 
it is also believed that there should be little evidence of a 
deficit in the ability to recall negative elements.
Therefore, the area with the greatest room for recall
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improvement will be for positive elements of the stories.
The third hypothesis, therefore, is that the greatest amount 
of memory improvement for all groups from pre- to post-test 
will be for items of positive valence.
The method for this study will be similar to the Watts 
et al. (1988b) study, with the exception that stories 
containing positive, neutral, and negative events will be 
used instead of the more neutral ones. Some of the variables 
in the Watts et al. study proved to be of no consequence. As 
a result, these variables (e.g., subject classification based 
on state vs. trait anxiety and verbalizers vs. visualizers), 
will not be studied.
Method
Overview
Ninety college students were screened for depression 
using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). Those scoring at 
or above a 12 on this instrument were asked to participate in 
the experiment. Only those subjects who also met this cutoff 
score during a second administration of the BDI at the time 
of the experimental manipulation were allowed to continue in 
the experiment. All subjects participated in the experiment 
on an individual basis.
The experimenter informed the subjects that the study 
was investigating memory, and asked them to pay attention to 
a story that was about to be read. After the experimenter 
read the passage, subjects solved simple arithmetic problems 
for ten minutes. These problems served as an interference 
task to prevent any rehearsal of the story. Subjects were 
then asked to write down as much of the story as they could 
remember. This served as the pre-test.
Next, one group of subjects was instructed to use 
imagery in recalling a story, while another group was 
instructed to use a more cognitive strategy as a memory aid. 
In order to give subjects practice in using the techniques, 
both groups were read a short passage and asked to repeat it 
verbally from memory. A third group, the control group, 
received no such instruction. They worked on a task 
unrelated to memory during this phase of the experiment.
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The experimenter then read all subjects a second story 
similar in content to the one used for the pre-test, 
instructing them to use the learned technique to assist in 
recall (subjects in the control group did not get these 
instructions). After a ten minute interference phase 
involving more arithmetic problems, subjects were again asked 
to write down all they remembered of the second story. This 
served as the post-test. All subjects were then administered 
a manipulation check, debriefed, and given class credit for 
their participation in the experiment.
-S.ub.je-Q.t-S-
Ninety introductory psychology students at the 
University of Montana (22 male, 68 female; mean age: 21) 
served as subjects. All subjects received class credit for 
their participation. The Watts et a l . (1988b) study reported
that the imagery technique employed in that study was most 
effective for patients diagnosed with reactive, rather than 
endogenous depression. This experiment used dysphoric 
college students because this population would be most 
analogous to patients with reactive depression, allowing 
greater generalization. Subjects were treated in accordance 
with the "Ethical Principles of Psychologists" (American 
Psychological Association, 1981) .
Subjects were initially screened by administering the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, & 
Erbaugh, 1961), and those subjects who scored at 12 or above, 
indicating at least a mildly dysphoric mood, were asked to
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participate in the study. The BDI is a widely used and 
popular method of identifying depressed individuals, and has 
sufficient reliability and validity for this purpose. The 
BDI is a 21-item self-report instrument that provides a 
measure of an individual's current level of depression. It 
has been shown to correlate highly with other measures of 
depression (Davies, Burrows, & Poynton, 1975; Gotlib, 1984) 
and with psychiatrists' ratings (Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 
1978). Because the time between the screening and the 
experimental manipulation usually lasted a few days, subjects 
completed the BDi a second time just prior to beginning the 
experiment. This was to assess each subject's level of 
dysphoria at the time of the manipulations. Only those 
subjects who still scored above the cutoff participated in
the experiment. The mean BDI score for this second
administration was 18.2 (range = 12-39), a level indicating 
moderate dysphoria. The mean BDI scores for the imagery, 
cognitive, and control groups were M = 18.17, 17.57, and 
18.83, respectively. There were no differences between 
groups regarding level of depression, as assessed by a one­
way analysis of variance using experimental group as the 
independent variable and BDI scores as the dependent measure,
F(2,87) = 0.326, £ > .05. Separate one-way analyses of
variance were also conducted to assess any differences 
between groups with respect to sex and age of subjects. In 
the imagery, cognitive, and control groups the mean number of 
women was 20, 25, and 23, respectively, F(2,87) = 1.13, p >
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.05. The mean age for the imagery, cognitive, and control 
groups was 23, 20, and 21 years, respectively, F<2,87) =
1.67, p > .05. These procedures for selecting dysphoric 
subjects are in accordance with the recommendations put forth 
by Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, & Ingram (1987).
Materials
Two passages, each with approximately 640 words served 
as stimuli. One of the passages was adapted from Breslow, et 
al. (1981). Each passage was a narrative containing a 
mixture of 15 positive, 15 neutral, and 15 negative elements 
regarding a person's day. Each passage was constructed 
sentence by sentence with either a positive, negative, or 
neutral theme in mind. Thus, each sentence, or in some 
instances a part of a sentence, involved a natural unit of 
analysis for scoring. As in the Breslow, et al. (1981) 
study, in constructing themes every attempt was made to state 
them in simple, declarative statements with comparable 
amounts of detail and grammatical usage.
The passages were constructed to be equal in positive, 
negative, and neutral content so that one story was not more 
negative or positive than the other. The negative themes of 
the stories were based on the categories of masochistic dream 
material described by Beck (1967). Such material typically 
portrays the subject as being less fortunate or less 
attractive than he or she is in reality, or as being 
subjected to an unpleasant experience. The specific 
categories described by Beck that were used in story
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construction for the the present study include physical 
discomfort and injury; thwarting; deprivation; physical 
attack; non-physical attack; being excluded, superseded, or 
abandoned; and being lost.
The positive themes of the two passages used in this 
study were derived from Dahl's classification of the positive 
emotions (Dahl, 1977). In essence, these themes are the 
antithesis of Beck's masochistic categories, and include goal 
achievement, success, reward, relief, satisfaction, and the 
reception of altruistic assistance.. Neutral elements of the 
stories were mainly filler items used to continue the flow of 
each passage. The different elements occurred randomly 
throughout the stories in order to avoid patterns of valence 
(see Appendices A and B for the stories).
Bmc..e.dux.e
The author and advanced undergraduate students in 
psychology involved in a course designed to help them learn 
methods of research administered the experimental 
manipulations to subjects individually. Each assistant 
received training prior to beginning the study and had 
specific instructions to be read to subjects.
Those subjects who had scored above the cutoff during 
the screening were contacted and asked to return. Upon 
entering the testing room each student again completed the 
BDI, as well as the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The latter scale served primarily 
as a control to avoid demand characteristics that may arise
34
from a second administration of the BDI. Subjects who no 
longer scored above the cutoff on the BDI were excused, while 
subjects still scoring at a 12 or above continued in the 
experiment.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: imagery memory technique, cognitive memory
technique, or a no treatment control condition. Thirty 
subjects served in each group. The experimenter told 
subjects, "This is a memory experiment. I am going to read 
you a story, and I want you to pay close attention because 
you will be asked to reproduce this story from memory as best 
as you can later on." The experimenter read one of the 
stories aloud at a medium, steady pace. The order of story 
presentation was balanced to avoid order effects. Following 
the reading, subjects performed an unrelated interference 
task (solving simple math problems) for approximately ten 
minutes in order to prevent rehearsal of the stories. After 
the interference period subjects were asked to write down as 
much of the story as they could remember. Instructions to 
subjects were as follows: "Now I would like you to write
down as much of the story as you can remember. Even though 
you may not be able to remember the exact words of a 
sentence, try to write down the meaning of it as close as 
possible to the original story." Scores from this recall 
served as the pre-test.
Imagery Instructions. Subjects in the imagery memory 
technique group then received the memory instructions
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pertaining to their condition, followed by training and
guided practice in using the instructed technique. A
potential problem for the study was the lack of motivation
often observed in depressed individuals (Beck, 1967). As
with the Watts et al. (1988b) study, it was anticipated that
instructions alone would not be sufficient, justifying the
use of this guided practice.
This practice phase involved the reading of a short
passage, neutral in content to avoid any effects on mood (see
Appendix C for the passage). In the imagery condition
subjects received instructions similar to those in the Watts
et al. (1988b) study. They were as follows:
I would like to see just how well you can 
concentrate on a passage if you really try to 
picture what you hear. Try to form a mental image 
of each scene as I describe it. Put yourself in 
the scene and see what is going on. Experience 
what is happening. Make pictures in your head 
about what is happening. Imagine that you are part 
of the story.
The experimenter then read the short passage. At select 
points during the practice passage the experimenter stopped 
and gave "imagine that" instructions. Following the passage 
subjects were asked to describe the scene as vividly as 
possible. If the subject had difficulty in recalling parts 
of the practice story the examiner gave cues until the 
subject recalled the part, and suggested a possible image 
that might be used to recall that section of the passage.
For instance, if the name of a store couldn't be recalled, 
the examiner might have suggested picturing the sign above
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the door. Subjects were read the practice story only once, 
and were asked to recall it only once. The total time for 
this phase of the experiment was approximately ten minutes.
Cognitive Instructions. The procedures for the subjects
in the cognitive condition were identical to the procedures
in the imagery condition, except for the memory instructions
and type of assistance during the practice phase.
Instructions for the cognitive group were as follows:
I would like to see just how well you can 
concentrate on a passage if you really try to think 
about the words and ideas that you hear. Try to
think about what is read. Say the words over again
in your head, thinking about the ideas expressed in 
the story. Think about what is happening. Think 
about the ideas that are being expressed.
At the same select points in the story as the imaginal group,
the experimenter stopped and gave "think about that"
instructions. Subjects were then asked to repeat the story
as clearly as possible. When subjects in this group had
difficulty in recalling parts of the passage, the
experimenter again offered cues, and suggested a theme or
idea for that part of the practice story. For instance, if
the name of a store couldn't be recalled, the experimenter
might have suggested the relationship between the name of the
store and the store's purpose (e.g., the "Fast-fax" copy
store makes copies and faxes, and also wants to advertise its
speed).
Following the practice the experimenter instructed 
subjects to use the memory technique that they had just 
learned to aid recall of the post-test story, which was then
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read aloud once. That is, subjects in the imagery condition 
were reminded to "picture everything you hear, just like you 
did on the other story. Create a mental picture", and in the 
cognitive condition subjects were told to "concentrate on the 
thoughts and ideas just like you did on the other story. Say 
them over again in your mind." No other instructions were 
given once the reading of the post-test passage had begun. 
Simple arithmetic problems again served as an interference, 
lasting ten minutes. After this interference phase subjects 
were again asked to write down as much of this post-test 
story as possible, using the same instructions as in the pre­
test phase.
Control Group. Procedures for the pre-test phase of the 
experiment were the same for subjects in the control group. 
However, during the training and practice phase of the 
imagery and cognitive conditions, the control group performed 
an unrelated task - Raven's Progressive Matrices. This task 
is fairly easy to complete in the beginning, so as not to 
cause any frustration or anxiety, affecting concentration. 
Subjects worked on this measure for the same amount of time 
it took the experimental groups to complete their training 
and practice, approximately ten minutes. Before reading the 
post-test passage the experimenter told subjects in the 
control group to simply "concentrate on the story as well as 
you can."
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Manip.vl.at.i.on  Check
After the post-test all subjects were asked to identify 
the method they felt they relied upon the most in recalling 
the post-test story. They also rated how effective they felt 
that method was and indicated if they felt they would try to 
use that technique in the future (see Appendix D for the 
manipulation check). In order to avoid demand 
characteristics, the question was asked as follows: "We have
found that about one-third of the people think of words to 
memorize, about one-third use pictures, and about one-third 
use no particular method. Can you tell me which method you 
feel you actually relied upon the most in remembering the 
second story?" This ended the experiment. Subjects were 
then debriefed in full (see Appendix E for the debriefing 
statement).
Scoring of Responses
Two undergraduate psychology majors, blind to the 
conditions of the experiment, performed the content analysis 
for all subjects' stories. Guidelines for scoring were 
constructed and given to the two raters, who received 
training in their use prior to scoring the experimental data. 
Positive, negative, and neutral elements were scored as 
either present or absent. In order for an element to be 
considered present, the statement written by the subjects 
must have contained both the general subject matter of the 
original element and the original theme of that statement.
For example, if one of the positive elements in a story
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involved the character's good mood, any statement in the 
reproduction that indicated the character's good mood was 
scored as present. Appendices F and G contain the scoring 
guidelines for both stories. The order in which subjects 
wrote the various elements was not considered important, nor 
was the exact wording of phrases. Final scores were the 
total points in each valence category. Thus, subjects could 
have received 15 points for each of the positive, neutral, 
and negative categories, for a possible total of 45 points 
per story. This scoring method was consistent with that used 
in Breslow et al. (1981).
Results
SLi mul.ua F.quaJJJag
The valence equality of the two stimulus passages was 
verified by having 20 college students read both stories and 
rate each element on a 5-point Likert-type scale. The 
stories were presented in their entirety. Each element, 
however, was identified by a number. This number indicated 
to the students that they were to rate that element on the 
Likert scale, with 1 being very negative and 5 being very 
positive.
To be considered equal in valence the ratings of the two 
stories should be highly correlated, such that high ratings 
on one story (indicating positive valence) would correspond 
to high ratings on the other story. Additionally, 
statistical differences should be found between the valence 
ratings of the non-corresponding elements within the same 
story and between ratings of non-corresponding elements of 
the other story (non-corresponding elements means elements 
intended to be of a different valence, such as positive vs. 
negative). Such differences would indicate that there were 
indeed three distinct valence categories in the stories. No 
significant differences should be found in the ratings of 
corresponding elements of the two stories (e.g., the positive 
elements of "Bill's Day" and the positive elements of 
"Susan's Day"), ensuring that the elements of one story were
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not more extreme in valence than the corresponding elements 
of the other.
In order to assess the degree of correlation between the 
two stories, a Pearson product-moment correlation statistic 
was calculated using the entire range of valence ratings of 
each story. That is, the two sets of 45 ratings (one set per 
story) for all 20 student raters were grouped according to 
the intended valence category. Items intended to be positive 
were paired, those intended to be neutral were paired, and 
those intended to be negative were paired. These two lists 
of 900 ratings were then correlated. This statistic revealed 
that the two stories were highly positively correlated, x = 
.699.
Separate Bonferroni adjusted t-tests comparing the student 
ratings of the positive, neutral, and negative elements of 
each story were computed. In other words, ratings of the 
positive elements of one story were compared with ratings of 
the negative and neutral elements of the same story, and also 
with the ratings of the positive, negative, and neutral 
elements of the other story. The ratings of all 
corresponding elements did not differ significantly from each 
other, p. > .05. Ratings of all non-corresponding elements 
both within and between stories did indeed differ 
significantly, p < .001. Tables 1, 2, and 3 contain the 
means and t-values for these analyses. The means for these 
analyses are also presented in Figure 1. Altogether, these
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Table 1
Means and t-values for Rated Element.5__.Q.£_..St_imulus Passages
Bill's Story
Susan's Story
Positive 
M = 4.26
Neutral 
M = 3.23
Negative 
M = 1.79
Positive 
M = 4.26
-0.02 -19.25* -38.42*
Neutral 
M = 3.30
20.02* -1.41 -28.23*
Negative 
M = 1.80
47.16* 26.72* -0.12
Note. ^.-values at cell intersections are for each comparison
between the valence categories of the two stories.
*p < .001
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Table 2
Means and T-values for Comparisons of Valence Elements Within, 
the."Bill's Day" Story
Positive Neutral Negative
M = 4.26 M = 3.23 M = 1.79
Positive 
M = 4.26
— 18.83* 40.66*
Neutral 
M  = 3.23
— — -26.55*
Negative
M = 1.79
Note. ^.-values at cell intersections are for each comparison
between the elements within "Bill's Day".
*U < -001
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Table 3
Means and T-values for Comparisons of Valence Elements Within 
the "Susan's Dav" Story
Positive Neutral Negative
M = 4.26 M = 3.30 M = 1.80
Positive 
M = 4.26
— 17.84* 41.47*
Neutral 
M = 3.30
— — 31.50*
Negative
M = 1.80
Note. t-values at cell intersections are for each comparison
between the valence categories within "Susan's Day".
*p < .001
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Figure 1
5
Bill's Day" 
Susan's Day'
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Positive NegativeNeutral
Valence Elements
Mean valence ratings for story elements.
Higher ratings indicate more positive valence.
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results indicate that the stories were equal in content and 
did contain three groups of elements differing in valence.
Inter-rater Re 1 iab.i 1 i t. y
The two raters, blind to the purpose of the study, were 
given specific guidelines and training in conducting the 
content analysis for the two stories. Pilot testing with 
non-depressed subjects was conducted in order to give 
experimenters practice the procedures of the study. This 
resulted in the collection of 20 sets of data (two stories 
per set), which served as the training data for the two 
raters. The raters were each given ten data sets, consisting 
of ten written protocols of "Bill's Day" and ten written 
protocols of "Susan's Day", and were asked to score them 
according to the presented guidelines. The author then 
compared the two raters1 scores for the first ten data sets 
and identified common errors or misconceptions in scoring.
This feedback was provided and the second set of data were 
given to the raters for scoring. At the end of the training 
procedure a Cohen's kappa of .82 for "Bill’s Day" and of .86 
for "Susan's Day" had been achieved. This was considered an 
acceptable level of reliability, and no further training was 
given once the actual scoring had begun.
Scoring
After all experimental data had been scored by the two 
raters individually, the author compared all scores and again 
identified disagreements, but provided no feedback as to how
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to settle them. The two raters then settled all 
disagreements by discussion without assistance. The final 
tally of responses for each subject, as agreed upon by the 
two raters, served as the recall scores. Thus, there were 
six scores per subject, one for each valence category in both 
stories.
The Effect of Depression.on .Recall
Much of the current literature in the area of depression 
and memory has shown that the ability to recall stimuli 
decreases as level of depression increases. Based on this 
finding, it was believed that the present study would also 
show such effects prior to any experimental manipulation. To 
assess the effect the level of dysphoria was having on 
recall, four Pearson product moment correlation coefficients 
were calculated between subjects' BDI scores at the time of 
manipulation and the pre-test positive, pre-test neutral, 
pre-test negative, and pre-test total (the sum of the three 
valence categories) scores. These coefficients, x  = 0.016, x  
= 0.017, x  = 0.037, and x  = 0.016, respectively, were all 
non-significant, suggesting that level of depression did not 
have a significant effect on recall in general, nor on the 
recall for items of specific valence. Because of the 
truncated range of BDI scores (the modal score was 13), 
however, the correlation statistic may not be an appropriate 
test for the effect of depression on recall scores. There is 
other evidence that suggests depression was indeed having an
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effect on recall, which will be discussed in more detail 
later.
Me_m_o_ryLJEjnprojyLem,ent_
The experimental data were analyzed in a single 3 
(memory condition) X 2 (pre- post-test) X 3 (valence) 
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the second and 
third variables. The dependent measures for this analysis 
were the total recall scores for each of the three valence 
categories, for a total of six scores (three pre-test and 
three post-test) per subject. Table 4 summarizes the anova 
results, and Table 5 displays the means and standard 
deviations for all groups. On the whole, only a single main 
effect reached significance, and there were no significant 
interactions.
The first hypothesis of this study, that subjects in all 
conditions would improve in the number of items recalled from 
pre- to post-test, was tested in the analysis of variance by 
the main effect of Pre- Post-test. This analysis failed to 
reach significance, E(l,87) = 0.636, p > .05. Thus, it 
appears that subjects in all groups did not show an 
improvement in the amount of story items recalled when 
averaged across valence category.
The second hypothesis was that the greatest improvement 
in story recall from pre- to post-test would be found in the 
imagery group because of this method’s hypothesized superior 
assistance to memory. For this hypothesis to be supported, 
the Condition X Pre- Post-test interaction should be
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Table 4
Summary Table for Three-Way Anova
Source of Variance df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Square £
Condition (A) 2 133.137 66.569 2.328
Error 87 2488.122 28.599
Pre- Post-test (B) 1 4.267 4 .267 0.350
A X B 2 15.478 7.739 0.636
Error 87 1059.256 12.175
Valence (C) 2 489.404 244.702 88.500*
A X C 4 4 . 485 1.121 0.406
Error 174 481. Ill 2.765
B X C 2 0.033 0.017 0.006
A X B X C 4 13.989 3.4 97 1.244
Error 174 488.978 2.810
*E> < .0001
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for Each Experimental Group
Pre-Test Post-Test
Condition Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative
Imagery
M 6.97 7.63 9.33 6.97 7.83 9.37
SD 2.54 2.76 2.97 3.18 2.90 3.71
Cognitive
M 8.30 8.53 9.83 8.50 9.17 10.90
SD 2.85 3.01 3.16 2.40 2.70 3.12
Control
M 7.20 8.13 10.10 7.60 7.80 9.50
SD 2.39 2.71 2.92 2.81 3.16 3.32
Total
M 7.49 8.10 9.76 7.69 8.27 9.92
SD 2.64 2.82 3.00 2.85 2.96 3.43
Cno
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significant. This interaction, however, did not reach 
significance, £(2,87) = 0.636, £ > .05. These results 
indicate that the three experimental groups did not 
differentially improve in the number of story items recalled 
when averaged across valence category.
The third hypothesis of this study, that the greatest 
improvement in story recall for all groups would be found in 
the positive elements of the stories, was tested in this 
analysis by the Valence X Pre- Post-test interaction. This 
statistic also failed to reach significance, £(2,174) =
0.406, p. > .05. The lack of a significant Valence X Pre- 
Post-test interaction indicates that subjects in this study 
did not differentially improve in their recall of items 
varying in valence.
If all three of the hypotheses of this study had been 
supported, one might also expect to find a significant three- 
way interaction between experimental condition, pre- post­
test, and valence of information. A significant interaction 
of this sort would reflect that subjects in the three 
conditions all differentially improved in their recall of 
story items from pre- to post-test. That is, one group would 
show more improvement in number of items recalled than 
subjects in another condition. In addition, items varying in 
valence would be recalled differentially, such that greater 
improvement in recall would be found in items of a particular 
valence category relative to another. This three-way 
interaction, however, also failed to reach significance,
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£1(4, 174) = 1.244, p > .05. Thus, the three hypotheses of 
this study were not supported. Some possible reasons for 
these results are discussed below.
The analysis of variance, however, did reveal a 
significant main effect of valence, £(2, 174) = 88.50, p. < 
.0001. This finding indicates that subjects differentially 
recalled items in each valence category when averaged across 
pre- and post-tests. This particular effect was not 
hypothesized in the present study because the primary 
interests of this investigation lie in the improvement of 
recall scores, and not in the overall differences in the 
recall of items within each valence category across pre- and 
post-tests.
However, due to the significant main effect of information 
valence, a Newman-Keuls' multiple range test was performed in 
order to assess differences between the mean number of 
recalled elements in each valence category. The means and 
standard deviations used in this analysis are presented in 
Table 6. The results of this test were in the direction that 
would be predicted for dysphoric subjects, namely that these 
subjects tended to recall a greater number of negative 
elements overall. Subjects in all conditions of the 
experiment recalled a greater number of negative items than 
would be expected by chance, followed by recall of neutral 
items. Positive items in the stories showed the least amount 
of recall in all groups in both pre- and post-tests, p < .01. 
Refer to Figure 2 for an illustration of these differences.
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations for Recall Scores Across Pre- 
and Post-Tests
M SD
Positive 7 .59* 2.42
Neutral 8.18* 2 .35
Negative 9.84* 2.46
*Means differ significantly from each other at £  < .01.
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Figure,. .2
□  Pre-Test
□  Post-Test1 3 :2
8
CDcc
Positive Neutral Negative
Valence
Mean recall of elements in each valence category.
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Subjects' responses were also scored for various errors 
in recall such as interference and transformations. An item 
was labeled as an interference if it was written down during 
the post-test recall phase, but was a part of either the pre­
test story, the practice story, or not part of any story.
This error never occurred. Transformations involve a 
discrepancy between the subject's written recall of a 
particular item's valence and the intended valence. An 
extreme example of a transformation would be if a story 
mentioned the character's good mood but the subject wrote 
down that the character was in a bad mood. There were six 
possible transformations: positive to neutral, positive to
negative, neutral to positive, neutral to negative, negative 
to positive, and negative to neutral. The above example, 
therefore, would be marked as a positive to negative 
transformation. When a transformation occurred in a 
subject's protocol it was not counted as an accurate 
recollection, and so was not included in the final scores. 
Transformations did occasionally occur, the most common of 
which were positive to neutral and negative to neutral, 
usually a result of omitting the key words that gave the item 
its particular valence rating (such as "...which upset him" 
or "...and was pleased to find..."). These occurrences, 
however, were rare, and showed no consistent pattern, such as 
only occurring during post-test, or only found in a 
particular condition, and therefore were difficult to
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interpret. They were most likely due to short-cuts in 
writing, a point that will be discussed later.
Manipulat ion ...CfaacJs.
Three separate chi-square tests, one for each 
experimental group, were computed in order to analyze the 
frequency data generated by the first question of the 
manipulation check. This question asked subjects to indicate 
which method they felt they relied upon the most during the 
post-test (see Appendix D ) . The chi-square test for subjects 
in the imagery condition reached significance, X2 (2, N = 30)
= 21.80, £ < .001. A greater number of subjects instructed 
to use imagery indicated that they in fact used this method 
more than would be expected by chance. The chi-square test 
for subjects in the cognitive condition failed to reach 
significance, X2 (2, N = 30) = 5.40, p > .05. The 
distribution of responses for subjects instructed to use the 
cognitive technique did not differ from chance. Subjects 
instructed to use the cognitive method were just as likely to 
use imagery as they were the cognitive technique. The chi- 
square test for subjects in the control condition reached 
significance, X2 (2, M = 30) = 6.20, p. < .05. Subjects given 
no specific instructions to assist recall tended to use 
imagery more than a cognitive technique or none at all.
Table 7 summarizes the data used in these analyses.
In general, these data suggest that the manipulation for 
subjects in the imagery condition was successful, such that 
subjects given instruction to use this technique did in fact
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Table 7
Incidence Table for the Chi-Square Statistics Evaluating the 
Effectiveness, .of the Manipulation
Method Used
Condition Imagery Cognitive
No-
Particular
Imagery** 22 / 10 3 / 1 0 5 / 1 0
Cognitive 13 / 10 13 / 10 4 / 1 0
Control* 16 / 10 9 / 1 0 5 / 1 0
Note. Technique used as reported by subjects / Expected in 
each cell
*Chi-square statistic significant, p < .05.
**Chi-square statistic significant, p < .001.
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use it during the post-test. However, the cognitive 
manipulation was not as strong as intended since subjects in 
this condition were just as likely to report relying on 
imagery as they were the cognitive technique. Subjects in 
the control condition, who had received no specific 
instructions for post-test recall, tended to report relying 
on imagery to assist in memory more than would be expected by 
chance. Thus, the use of imagery was over-represented in the 
sample, indicating a weak overall manipulation of memory 
technique.
Since it was hypothesized that subjects in the imagery 
condition would produce better recall scores than other 
subjects during the post-test, it was believed that those 
subjects who actually used imagery (as indicated in the 
manipulation check) would recognize the improvement in recall 
more readily than subjects in the other conditions. They 
would therefore be more likely to report that they would try 
to use this technique again in the future. Subjects in the 
cognitive and control conditions, who would not find as great 
an improvement in memory, would not show such a preference.
As a post-hoc analysis to test this question, a chi- 
square statistic was calculated to analyze the frequency with 
which subjects indicated that they would use the technique 
reported in question one of the manipulation check again.
The expected frequencies for this analysis were based on 
conditional probability estimates. The frequencies were 
calculated by multiplying the probability of being in any
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single experimental condition (p = .33) by the probability of 
responding "Yes" "No", or "Unsure". These later 
probabilities differ because inclusion in these groups were 
based on subjects' self-assignment when answering question 3 
of the manipulation check, resulting in an unequal 
distribution of subjects in each category. Also, because of 
the large number of low expected frequencies in the cells for 
subjects answering "No" or "Unsure", the observed frequencies 
for these cells within each group were combined. The chi- 
square statistic was significant, X2 (2, H = 90) = 28.51, p < 
.001. Table 8 presents the contingency table for this 
analysis. Subjects who used images during the post-test 
stated that they would use that technique again more than 
would be expected by chance. Subjects who used no particular 
memory technique during the post-test stated that they would 
not, or were unsure if they would, use that approach in the 
future. While a majority of subjects using the cognitive 
method said that they would use it again in the future, the
distribution for this group did not differ from what would be
expected by chance alone.
Assuming that a willingness to use a technique again in 
the future is an indication of satisfaction with performance, 
this analysis suggests that dysphoric subjects who use a 
specific memory technique are more satisfied with their 
performance than subjects who use no method in particular.
This interpretation is limited, however, by the fact that
subjects did not experience the relative effectiveness of all
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Table 8
Chi-Square Contingency Table of Subject Reports of 
Willingness to Use the Technique Again
Would You Use it Again?
Method Used Yes No or Unsure Total Observed
Imagery 48 / 40.23 3 / 10.77 51
Cognitive 19 / 19.72 6 / 5.28 25
No Particular 4 / 11.04 10 / 2.96 14
Total Observed 71 19 90
Note. Observed reports / Expected
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three choices, and so did not have any basis for comparison.
It may be that without any knowledge of relative efficacy, 
subjects simply tended to state that they would use in the 
future whatever method they used in the experiment. Subjects 
who reported using no particular method may have also been in 
the awkward position of having to answer "yes" or "no" to 
using a method that they really couldn't identify. Answering 
"unsure", as the majority of subjects in this group did, 
provided a logical answer.
As part of the manipulation check, subjects rated how 
much they felt the method they used helped their recall. 
Because of the unequal Ns in group cells, a one-way,
unweighted means analysis of variance was computed in order
to assess any differences among groups on this variable. In 
this analysis the method subjects reported using served as 
the independent variable and the assistance ratings from the 
Likert-type scale served as the dependant variable. The 
groups in this analysis had unequal £s for the independent 
variable because groups were self-assigned (i.e., subjects 
placed themselves in a group when they indicated which method 
they used, which resulted in an unequal distribution). The 
analysis of variance was significant, £(2,87) = 7.20, p. <
.01. Thus, the three groups differentially rated the amount 
of help provided by their respective memory techniques. The 
summary table for this anova is presented in Table 9.
Scheffe F-tests were used in order to assess the nature of
the differences between the mean assistance-ratings for each
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Table 9
Unweighted Means Analysis of Variance for Assistance Rating
Source df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Square E
Technique Used 2 19.624 9.812 7.20*
Within Subjects 87 118.461 1.362
Total 89 140 .473
Note. Cell Ns for the Imagery, Cognitive, and No Particular 
memory techniques were 51, 25, and 14, respectively.
< .01
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Table 10
Mean Assistance Ratings for Memory Technique Used by Subjects
Method Used M sn H
Imagery 4 .11* 1.01 51
Cognitive 3.41 1.44 25
No Particular 2.81* 1.16 14
Note. Scores were on a scale of 1 (indicating the technique 
interfered with recall) and 5 (indicating the technique 
greatly assisted in recall).
*Means differ significantly at £ < .05.
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group (see Table 10). These tests revealed that subjects who 
reported using imagery rated this method as being more 
helpful than the subjects who used no method in particular 
rated their approach, p < .05. The assistance ratings of 
subjects who used the cognitive technique did not differ from 
those subjects who used either imagery or no method in 
particular, p > .05. Essentially, subjects who used the 
cognitive technique reported that it neither helped nor hurt 
recall.
Discussion
The three principle hypotheses of this investigation 
predicted that all subjects would improve in the amount of 
story items recalled, that the greatest improvement in recall 
would be found in subjects who used the imagery technique, 
and that the greatest improvement for all groups would be 
found in items of positive valence. The results, however, 
failed to support these hypotheses. The current 
investigation did, however, reveal a significant effect of 
information valence, such that subjects in all conditions 
tended to recall more negative elements than neutral, and 
more neutral elements than positive. The following is a 
discussion of these results.
The significant main effect of information valence can 
perhaps best be explained in terms of mood dependent memory. 
Subjects were apparently mildly dysphoric during both story 
presentation and recall, and therefore tended to remember 
elements of the stories consistent with that mood. If this 
is the case then it can be stated with some confidence that 
this study was indeed using a dysphoric population. The non­
significant correlations between depression level and amount 
of pre-test recall may be explained by the truncated 
distribution of BDI scores. The modal BDI score was 13 and 
the distribution was highly positively skewed because of a 
very few subjects who scored high on the BDI, meaning that 
there was not a large enough range of depression to get an
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accurate correlation coefficient. While a non-dysphoric 
control group was not used in this investigation, given the 
large body of literature demonstrating the effects of mood on
memory, it does not seem likely that a non-dysphoric group
would produce recall scores similar to those found in the 
present study. This interpretation, however, is only a 
hypothesis, as the data from this study were not designed to 
be able to make such conclusions. The remainder of this
discussion will focus on the unsupported hypotheses and offer
suggestions as to why they weren't supported in the present 
study.
The first hypothesis of this study predicted that all 
groups would improve in recall from pre- to post-test. There 
are two reasons why one would expect to find such an 
improvement. One is simply a practice effect. During the 
pre-test phase subjects learn about the type of material to 
be presented, and perhaps learn to "fine tune" their encoding 
strategy. The second reason is that a great many of the 
subjects in all groups reported using imagery to encode the 
post-test story. Numerous studies have found that the use of 
imagery often results in improvement in recall, an effect 
that appears to hold for a variety of populations (c.f., 
Alesandrini, 1982; Powell, 1981; Jonides, Kahn, & Rozin,
1975; Traupmann & Anderson,. 1981; Levin & Divine-Hawkins,
1974). The present study, however, failed to replicate such 
a finding.
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A potential explanation for the lack of a practice 
effect lies in the nature of the procedures of the 
experiment. Subjects were asked twice to write down from 
memory a 640 word story after completing ten minutes worth of 
arithmetic problems. Writing such lengthy stories twice, in 
addition to doing simple arithmetic problems are quite 
tedious tasks, the monotony of which may have hampered 
motivation to write down as much as was actually remembered. 
Writing down two fairly long stories may have been too much 
to ask of subjects, so that by the post-test recall subjects 
simply left parts out or took "short cuts" such as just 
listing elements of the story. Such a tactic would have the 
effect of eliminating many of the neutral filler items, 
resulting in a net decrease in recall scores. It follows 
that if subjects did actually recall more of the stories 
during the post test, but wrote down less than they 
remembered due to writing fatigue, no improvement would be 
noted. Anecdotally, upon giving the instructions to write 
once again as much of the story as possible, one subject 
sighed and asked if he could just verbally describe what he 
remembered, an indication that this study may have been quite 
tiresome for at least some of the subjects.
It would seem that research investigating story recall 
should employ a means of data collection requiring less work 
for subjects. Watts and Sharrock (1987) found that the 
ability to answer correctly a series of questions about a 
passage is just as sensitive to memory disturbance as free-
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recall. Watts and Sharrock1s method would probably be less 
affected by writing fatigue than the free recall task of the 
present study. It is likely, then, that the nature of the 
stories used, the fact that subjects were not instructed to 
use only the learned technique, and the tediousness of the 
tasks all served to obfuscate differences in recall between 
the groups of this study.
One must also look at the populations used in the two 
studies. Watts et al. used clinically depressed subjects, 
while the present study used dysphoric college students as an 
analogous population. This latter group of subjects would 
probably not meet the criteria for a depressive syndrome, 
suggesting that the mild dysphoria found in these college 
students, as assessed by the BDI, may be insufficient to 
demonstrate significant effects of depression on memory.
Ellis (1985) has criticized studies manipulating mood via 
subject classification on depression inventories because such 
methods are too weak to produce measurable effects. Ellis 
contends that the mood must be relatively strong in order to 
find memory deficits, and suggests that mood induction 
procedures are more preferable to subject classification on 
the basis of depression inventories in obtaining a more 
profound mood state. This explanation, however, is at least 
somewhat lacking in support because it does not address why 
other studies (e.g., Colby & Gotlib, 1988; Dobson & Shaw,
1981) have found memory deficits in depressed college 
students relative to non-depressed students when such
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subjects were obtained via subject classification strategies. 
In addition, a mood induction procedure would not be 
practical for the present study because of the length of time 
necessary to run each subject (approximately 1 1/2 hours) and 
the relatively short duration of moods induced by such 
procedures.
Ellis (1985) has also criticized story recall tasks such 
as the methods used in the present study, stating that they 
may make insufficient encoding demands on subjects because of 
their highly meaningful and logical structure. Stories, he 
claims, are much easier to encode and subsequently recall 
than memory tasks utilizing such stimuli as word lists, 
thereby making it more difficult to demonstrate mood effects 
on memory. This criticism may have more merit than his first 
criticism of subject classification procedures via depression 
inventories. It has been proposed that the memory deficits 
found in depressed individuals will be greater when encoding 
demands are more difficult, Remanding, or complex (Ellis & 
Lane, 1984; Ellis, in press, cited in Ellis, 1985) . Watts et 
al. (1988b) attempted to circumvent the problem of logical 
sequence and meaningfulness by specifically constructing 
their stories to be less interesting in order to maximize 
encoding demands. The stories used in the present study, 
because of their more engaging nature, most likely did not 
overcome the difficulties suggested by Ellis, the result 
being that subjects may not have evidenced poorer pre-test 
scores if compared to normal controls. The purpose of this
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study, however, was not to demonstrate memory deficits in 
dysphoric college students (a phenomenon already believed to 
exist) but rather to investigate methods of improving such 
deficits.
The combination of Ellis' two points, a relatively weak 
mood variable and the use of a meaningful, integrated story, 
make it difficult to rule out the possibility that there was 
actually little room for improvement during the post-test.
In effect, this study may lend support to Ellis' argument 
that story recall paradigms are not good candidates for 
demonstrating mood-memory effects. Further research 
investigating the nature of memory deficits in depression is 
needed. Specifically, it appears to be important to 
ascertain whether or not such deficits can consistently be 
found in story recall tasks, and to delineate the limits of 
such findings.
The second hypothesis of this study was that each group, 
imagery instruction, cognitive instruction, and control, 
would differentially improve in recall of the passages, with 
the greatest improvement seen in the imagery group. As Table 
4 indicates, this did not happen. Instead, none of the 
groups in this experiment showed improvement in story recall 
from pre- to post-test. One possible explanation for these 
results is that the Watts et a l . (1988b) imagery technique
may not be strong enough to stifle the depressive cognitions 
and improve access to positive memories. Imagery may be an 
effective memory aid, but the particular imagery technique
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used in this experiment may not have been strong enough to 
produce results, especially in a non-clinical population. 
Recall that the manipulation check revealed that most of the 
dysphoric subjects who used imagery felt that the use of 
imagery is helpful in memory, and so its use in this capacity 
should be explored further.
Analysis of the manipulation check revealed that while 
the imagery manipulation was successful, the cognitive 
manipulation was not. Inspection of the data revealed that 
many subjects in all groups reported using pictures and 
images for recalling the post-test story, indicating that the 
independent variable of memory technique was not successfully 
manipulated. The high incidence of imagery use within each 
group may have blurred any differences that may actually 
exist between the different types of instruction. Because of 
this confounding, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
differential efficacy of the memory techniques employed in 
this study.
One possible explanation for the lack of differentiation 
between groups in terms of the memory technique actually used 
during post-test, is that inadequate practice was provided. 
More adequate practice may have assisted subjects in easily 
utilizing only the instructed technique. This study provided 
the same amount of practice as that used in the the Watts et 
al. (1988b) study, but dysphoric college students may need 
even more practice than the depressed patients used in the 
Watts et al. study, since the latter group was actively
seeking treatment and may have been more receptive to 
following the instructions of the experimenters. Also, the 
more severe effects of the depressive syndrome may have been 
limiting the cognitive abilities of subjects in the Watts et 
a l . investigation, such that no other memory techniques 
occurred to them, whereas subjects in the present study were 
college students with presumably stronger study habits and 
memorization schemes.
Another reason for the failure of the manipulation may 
lie in the nature of the stories used. Recall that Watts et 
a l . (1988b) specifically chose a fairly neutral description 
as the test story in an effort to maximize the encoding 
effort of subjects, while this study used stories with a 
richer valence content. The wider range of valence may have 
made the stories more engaging and therefore less likely to 
result in maximum encoding effort. The result, for this 
study, would be no difference in encoding effort from pre- to 
post-test, eliminating potential differences attributable to 
memory technique.
Further, the story in the Watts et al. study was 
designed to be maximally sensitive to the imagery 
instruction. The stories used in the present investigation 
may have also lent themselves to the use of imagery, more so 
than the thoughts and ideas expressed therein. This 
interpretation is supported by the tendency for the control 
group, which received no specific instructions at all, to 
report using pictures and images more than any other method.
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The ability of these stories to elicit images, therefore, may 
be stronger than the influence of the cognitive instructions, 
thereby overriding the cognitive manipulation. There is, 
however, another explanation for the tendency for subjects to 
use imagery. It may be that people in general naturally use 
imagery with the type of information presented in these 
stimuli. This explanation does not seem likely, however, 
given that past research investigating the effectiveness of 
imagery instruction to aid in the recall of sentences and 
narratives was found to be superior to no instruction at all 
(Anderson, 1971; Anderson & Hidde, 1971; Rasco, Tennyson, & 
Boutwell, 1975) . If people tend to naturally use imagery, 
these studies would not have found such differences. 
Regardless, if there is a natural proclivity to use imagery, 
the absence of a strong enough manipulation to override it 
would likely produce the results found in this study. It 
would be important for future research to investigate the 
issue of a tendency for people to use imagery vs. stimulus 
pull for its use, since it may make a difference in the type 
of instructions given to subjects.
The instructions given to subjects during the post-test 
may also have affected the manipulation. Prior to reading 
the post-test story subjects were told to use the particular 
memory technique that they had just practiced in order to 
better remember the upcoming story. They were not, however, 
told not to use any other method. Subjects in the cognitive 
instruction group may have employed both methods and stated
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that they relied upon imagery the most because it is a more 
salient characteristic of the stories.
The final hypothesis not supported was that there would 
be a greater improvement in the number of positive elements 
of the story recalled relative to the negative and neutral 
elements. This was hypothesized because of mood dependent 
memory. It was believed that because of the dysphoric mood 
found in the subjects there would be a greater recall of the 
negative elements due to mood congruence during the pre-test, 
a phenomenon which did occur in this study. The logic was 
that since negative items are readily recalled, there would 
be little room for improvement in the recall of these story 
elements during post-test. Positive items, on the other 
hand, are more difficult for dysphoric subjects to remember, 
and so during pre-test recall fewer story elements in this 
valence category would be recalled. If the memory 
technique(s) were effective, the greatest room for 
improvement would be for these items, meaning that there 
would be a greater improvement in recall of positive story 
elements relative to negative ones. The data, however, 
showed no improvement in any valence category from pre-test 
to post-test. Subjects in all conditions recalled a greater 
number of negative elements than neutral, and more neutral 
than positive.
The reason for the failure to find support for this 
hypothesis, again, may have been due to the demands of the 
task. It has been suggested that students may have been
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writing down less of the story than was actually remembered 
because of the tediousness of writing down from memory such 
lengthy stories. It is also likely that because of the 
effects of dysphoria on memory, negative elements of the 
story would be more readily accessed in memory, while more 
effort would be needed to recall positive elements. If 
subjects were putting little effort into post-test writings 
by simply writing down whatever was easiest to recall, 
negative elements would be more prominent, and no improvement 
would be found.
Conclusion
This study sought to compare an imagery technique found 
to improve memory in depressed patients with a more cognitive 
technique, and to assess what effect information valence 
would have on recall. Overall, subjects recalled more 
negative elements of the stories in this study, suggesting 
the presence of mood-dependant memory. However, three 
principle hypotheses of this study were not supported.
The first hypothesis was that subjects in all groups 
would improve in recall from pre- to post-test due to a 
practice effect. The second hypothesis was that subjects 
given instruction and practice in the use of imagery would 
show a greater amount of improvement in story recall relative 
to subjects given instruction and practice in a more 
cognitive method and subjects given no instruction at all.
The third hypothesis not supported was that the greatest 
amount of improvement in recall for all groups would be for
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the positive elements of the stories. The effectiveness of 
imagery as an aid to increase the recall of positive themes 
cannot be determined from this study. The story-recall 
format of the present experiment, the failure of the memory 
technique manipulation, and the writing intensive task for 
subjects confounded the results.
Past research has suggested that the logic and structure 
of narratives makes it difficult to demonstrate memory 
deficits in dysphoric subjects. Without memory deficits, 
memory improvements are equally difficult to demonstrate.
The fact that a majority of subjects in all conditions 
reported using imagery rather than the instructed technique 
may be due to a tendency for the stories to elicit images or 
to a pre-disposition for people to use imagery. Other 
possibilities for the-weak manipulation include inadequate 
practice and the fact that subjects were not instructed to 
use only the memory technique taught to them. Finally, the 
large amount of writing involved may have caused subjects to 
take short cuts when writing down the stories, giving an 
inaccurate account of actual recall.
Because many of the subjects who used imagery in the 
present study found it to be more helpful than subjects who 
used no method in particular, further research in the area of 
memory improvement in depression is needed in order to better 
understand the role of imagery in improving memory for 
depressed patients. This future research should take^ the 
following into account: (a) use stimuli designed to maximize
encoding demands; (b) use a means of data collection that 
minimizes the physical effort required of subjects; (c) if 
subject classification via depression inventories is the 
method chosen for subject selection, set a high enough cut 
off score to better ensure the presence of memory deficits 
(d) instruct subjects to use only the desired memory 
technique; and (e) provide adequate practice to ensure 
subjects are able to effectively use the desired memory 
method.
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Appendix A
Note. after a statement denotes positive valence,
" 0 " denotes neutral valence, and " - " denotes negative 
valence.
Bill's Day
Bill started his day in a bright, cheerful mood + .
The sun was shining and he felt that today was going to be a 
great day + . After getting dressed he went downstairs to 
eat breakfast when the phone rang 0 . It was his neighbor 
calling to inform him that his dog had dug up a flower bed 
over night, and that it would cost $7 5.00 to replace it - . 
This made Bill angry - . "Oh, Well", he sighed, and left 
the house 0 . He walked to the corner candy store to check 
his lottery ticket number 0 and felt great when he learned 
that he had won two hundred dollars _±_. While he was 
receiving the storekeeper's congratulations he suddenly
remembered he was late for work and rushed off afraid that he 
would lose his job - . At last Bill got to his office 0 . 
but when he tried to go in the door was locked - . Bill 
thought, "I really am stupid; I forgot that we changed 
offices today - ." So he set off to find his new office 0 .
On the way he was fascinated to observe two old friends 
of his walking together, since he had not realized they knew 
each other 0 . He hailed them and told them of his good 
fortune in winning the lottery _+_, and they congratulated 
him and remarked how happy they were for him + . They then
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began to talk about work 0 . They told Bill that he was the 
only one from the office not invited to the party next week, 
which ruined Bill's good mood, and, in fact, he felt quite 
left out and sad - . He couldn't help feeling that things 
just weren't going as well as he thought they would today - . 
Bill continued on and was soon quite absorbed in catching up 
to a woman from his office 0 . He walked a little faster so 
that he could catch up to her 0 . They said hello, and Bill 
felt better when she told him that he wasn't the only one to 
forget about the office change + .
Before lunch, they reached the office, and Bill's boss
remarked in front of everybody how foolish he was to have 
made such a mistake - . Bill couldn't do much except to sit 
there and take it, but he felt very embarrassed - . He then 
sat down at his desk and started to work 0 . The other 
workers laughed and teased Bill - f but then stopped, since 
they all admired his vigor and energy at work + . They knew 
he was a good employee, and some of them apologized to him
for laughing + . Soon it was lunchtime and Bill sent out
for a corned beef sandwich on rye 0 . He was frustrated 
when the delivery man brought him Swiss cheese on white bread 
n_. "What terrible luck," thought Bill - , but then he put 
it out of his mind and sat back in his desk chair to look 
over the office with a contented feeling of having done his 
job well + ... He really did like his job, and it made him
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realize that some of the bad things that had happened weren’t
all that terrible + .
When it was time to leave work, Bill remembered that he 
had to stop and get some groceries 0 . However, when he got
there the store had just closed and Bill couldn't get in - .
Bill's luck changed, however, because the clerk saw him and 
let in to buy the couple of things that he needed On
the way home Bill walked down a long dark street 0 f and a 
man came up to him and beat him over the head - . Bill ran 
away as fast as he could in fear for his life - . After a 
while he slowed down to catch his breath 0 r and when he got 
home he felt much better + . He was met at the door by his 
wife, whom he loved very much When he saw her he broke
into a smile, relieved to be home, and said, "I've got a lot 
to tell you, about what happened to me today," + and began 
to tell his story 0 .
Appendix B
Note. " + 11 after a statement denotes positive valence,
" 0 " denotes neutral valence, and 11 - " denotes negative 
valence.
Susan’s Day
Susan woke up very excited because today she was going on 
a picnic with some friends + . She went into the kitchen and 
began preparing a special dish to bring along to the picnic 0. 
After putting it in the oven Susan got dressed in her new 
outfit, and was very pleased with the way it looked on her 4- . 
An hour'later she realized that she was running late - , so 
she quickly got her things together and ran into the kitchen 
to get her casserole 0 . She then discovered that she had 
forgotten to turn the oven on "How stupid I am!" she
thought, and was very mad at herself - . She called a 
delicatessen and ordered sandwiches instead 0 , but when she 
got there they had forgotten her order - . The delicatessen 
apologized, and ended up giving her the sandwiches for free ±.
Susan got in her car and headed for the picnic 0 .
On the way Susan noticed how the sun was shining and 
thought, "This is a beautiful day,” and smiled in 
anticipation _±_. Apparently many other people had the same 
idea because it took over 45 minutes to find a parking spot
She soon found one and headed off to look for her 
friends 0 . She had a long way to walk, and ended up at the
wrong end of the park - . She saw someone that she knew,
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and was pleased to find out that he had made the same mistake 
as she did _±_, so the two of them headed off for the rest of 
the group 0 . On the way some boys playing football knocked 
her down - , causing her to scrape her knee rather badly_z_. 
She sat there for awhile quite upset and in a lot of pain - . 
After resting she got up and continued on her way 0 . Her 
friend happened to have some bandages, so he patched her up 
and made her feel a whole lot better + . Her frustration 
passed when she reached her friends because it felt great to 
see them all together + .
Susan noticed that people were playing softball and 
wanted to play 0 . There were too many people, though, and 
Susan didn't get picked to be on a team, which made her feel 
kind of worthless - . She sat and watched for a while 0 , 
until someone got tired and asked her to take his place, 
which made her happy During the game she made some
mistakes, and felt foolish - . She also felt that some of 
her friends were cruel because they laughed at her for making 
these mistakes - , but after the game they all complimented 
her for being a good sport and trying her best + . After 
the game everyone ate lunch 0 . Susan got embarrassed when 
she had to tell people why she brought deli sandwiches - , 
but everybody said they were good, and thanked her for 
bringing them
At the end of the day Susan got excited when a man that 
she really liked walked her to her car + . On the way he 
asked her out on a date which made her very happy + . They
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made plans to get together soon, and said goodbye 0 . On 
the way home she couldn't stop thinking about what a great 
day it was, and was very pleased with the way things went + . 
Her excitement was ruined, however, when a policeman pulled 
her over and gave her a speeding ticket - . Susan realized 
that she wasn't paying much attention to her driving, and got 
upset at herself for it - . She finally made it home, 
though, and sat down to relax 0 . Her cat let out a loud 
"Meow” and jumped up on Susan's lap 0 . Susan loved her 
cat, and felt really good when it began to purr in her arms 
+ . As she began to pet her cat she realized that he felt 
wet, and started to look around 0 . "Oh, No! This is 
terrible!" she cried out when she saw that the cat had 
knocked over a $100.00 crystal vase that had flowers in it 
After cleaning it up she sat down and thought about what a 
strange day it had been 0 .
Appendix C
Note. "[HERE]" inserted in the passage marks the point at 
which subjects were told to "Imagine that" if in the imagery 
condition, and to "Think about that" if in the cognitive 
condition.
Practice Passage
Walking down the street one can see a variety of people 
and places, each one interesting unto itself. The streets 
are full of the lunch time traffic right now. [HERE] That's 
probably the biggest change we've had in this small town. 
There has been an awful lot of growth, some good, and some 
bad. The old is still around, though. There, on the left 
you can see George's Old Town Cafe. [HERE] That place, along 
with George, has been around for as long as I can remember. 
All the old-timers go there to have a cup of coffee and talk 
about the good-old-days. Next to the cafe is Mary's Bakery.
[HERE] She makes the best apple cobbler in town. I've always 
said the two should combine their talents. What a money 
maker that would be. [HERE] Anyway, back to the changes. 
Across from the bakery is the Fast-Fax copy store. It seems 
out of place next to the older stores, but they're a sign of 
the times, one would guess. [HERE] A lot of folks don't like 
all the technological advances, but they have their place, I 
suppose. Like they say, "The more things change, the more 
they stay the same.
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Appendix D 
Rating Sheet
1. In order to help me remember the second story I primarily 
(mark the one method you feel you relied upon the most):
  used pictures and images
  thought about the words and ideas in the story
  used no particular method
2. How much did the method used (as indicated in #1) help 
you remember the story? (Place a mark on the line that 
best describes your feeling)
It made___________________________   It helped
things worse It neither a lot
helped nor hurt
3. Would you try to use this memory technique in the future?
   Yes
  No
  Unsure
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Appendix E
Debriefing Statement
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. This study 
was designed to test various methods of improving memory in 
dysphoric college students. You were chosen because the 
score you reached on questionnaires you filled out indicate 
that you may be feeling a little down right now.
Past research has shown that depressed people have trouble 
with their memory, particularly memory for positive events 
and statements. The stories you were read contained an equal 
number of positive, negative, and neutral statements, and we 
were looking at how many of each type you remembered on the 
second trial relative to the first trial. We were comparing 
three different methods of memory in order to find out which 
was most effective: Imagery (using pictures to remember),
cognitive instruction (saying the words over in your head), 
and a group that received no particular instructions.
If you are interested in reading about this area of 
psychology you might want to look up the following articles 
in the library:
Blaney, P. H. (1986). Affect and memory: A review.
Breslow, R., Kocsis, J. H., & Belkin, B. (1981). Contribution 
of the depressive perspective to memory function in 
depression. .jc.an_Jq u rniLi— af_.,.P.sy.oJiia£.;ry, 1M(2), 227-
230 .
Watts, F. N., MacLeod, A. K., & Morris, L. (1988b). A
remedial strategy for memory and concentration problems in 
depressed patients. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 12.(2), 
185-193.
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Appendix F
Scoring Criteria For Bill"s Day
Element.
Bill started 
his day in a 
bright, 
cheerful 
mood. +
Needed
Anything 
indicating 
Bill was in a 
good mood.
Examples
Bill was in a 
good mood. 
Bill woke up 
happy.
Not
Acceptable
Bill was sad. 
Bill was in a 
bad mood.
Bill woke up.
2. The sun was 
shining and 
he felt that 
today was 
going to be 
a great day. 
+
3. After 
getting 
dressed he 
went
downstairs 
to eat 
breakfast 
when the 
phone rang. 
&
An indication 
that Bill 
anticipated a 
good day.
Mention that 
Bill got a 
phone call in- 
the morning.
Bill had a 
feeling 
things would 
go great 
today. He 
looked
forward to a 
good day.
The phone 
rang before 
work. He got 
a call during 
breakfast.
The sun 
shined (no 
"feeling"). 
It was just 
another day 
for Bill.
Someone was 
at the door 
He called a 
neighbor.
4. It was his 
neighbor 
calling to 
inform him 
that his dog 
had dug up a 
flower bed 
over night, 
and that it 
would cost 
$75.00 to 
replace it.
Mention that 
his dog 
ruined 
something, 
and that it 
would cost 
between $7 0 
and $80 to 
repair it.
His dog dug 
up a yard, 
costing $76, 
Bills dog 
destroyed a 
flower bed, 
and would 
cost $70 to 
replace it.
His dog was 
in the pound 
and he had to 
go get it.
His dog 
ruined a 
yard, costing 
$200 to fix 
it u p .
5. This made 
Bill angry,
Mention that 
Bill was 
angry.
Bill got mad 
at this.
This upset 
Bill.
Bill laughed 
it off.
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6. "Oh, Well", 
he sighed, 
and left the 
house.
An indication 
that Bill got 
over it.
He didn't let 
it bother him 
for long.
What could he 
do?
Bill left for 
work. Bill 
left in a bad 
mood.
7. He walked 
to the
corner candy 
store to 
check his 
lottery 
ticket 
number. _J2
8. ... and felt 
great when 
he learned 
that he had 
won two 
hundred 
dollars. _±
An indication 
that he 
checked his 
lottery 
ticket.
(Candy store 
is not 
necessary.)
Any
indication 
that he had 
won money.
He checked 
his lottery 
ticket. He 
wanted to see 
if he won 
anything in 
the lottery.
He won two 
hundred 
dollars. He 
won money in 
the lottery.
He went to 
the store and 
bought some 
candy. He 
bought a 
baseball 
ticket.
He lost in 
the lottery. 
He lost a 
bet. He 
didn't win 
the lottery.
9. While he was 
receiving 
the store 
keepers 
congratulati 
ons, _±
10. ..he 
suddenly 
remembered 
he was late 
for work and 
rushed off 
afraid he 
would lose 
his job. -
Anything 
indicating 
Bill was 
congratulated
He was late 
for work, 
implying that 
he was
worried about 
getting in 
trouble for 
being late.
People
congratulated
him.
He was late 
for work and 
ran off, 
thinking he 
would be 
fired. Bill 
left in a 
hurry because 
he was late 
for work.
Nobody said 
anything to 
him.
He left for 
work. He was 
late for an 
appointment. 
He had to get 
to work.
11. At last 
Bill got to 
his office, 
0
An indication 
that Bill 
made it to 
work.
When he got 
to work... 
Bill made it.
It was a long 
walk. He had 
a ways to go 
to get there.
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12. but when 
he tried to 
go in the 
door was 
locked. _z.
13. Bill 
thought, "I 
really am 
stupid; I 
forgot that 
we changed 
offices 
today."
14. So he set 
off to find 
his new 
office. _0
15. On the way, 
he was 
fascinated 
to observe 
two old 
friends of 
his walking 
together, 
since he had 
not realized 
they knew 
each other.
&
16. He hailed 
them and 
told them of 
his good 
fortune in 
winning the 
lottery. +
The door to 
the office 
was locked.
Calling
himself
stupid.
He went to 
find the 
office.
Need Bill 
seeing two 
old friends 
walking 
together.
Bill told 
them that he 
had won in 
the lottery 
must be 
present.
He was locked 
out of his 
office. He 
couldn't get 
into the 
office 
because it 
was locked 
up.
I am really 
stupid. Bill 
thought about 
how stupid he 
was.
He left for 
the new 
office.
Bill saw his 
friends 
walking down 
the street. 
He ran into 
some friends 
walking 
together.
Bill told 
them he had 
won money. 
Bill
mentioned his 
luck in the 
lottery while 
speaking to 
them.
Bill went 
into the 
office.
Bill
remembered 
they moved 
offices today 
(without 
calling self 
stupid).
Bill didn't 
go to work. 
Bill couldn't 
find his new 
office.
Bill stopped 
at some 
friends' 
houses along 
the way.
Bill thought 
about some 
old friends 
on the way.
Bill spoke 
with his 
friends.
Bill hailed 
them to catch 
up on old 
times.
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17. and they 
congratulate 
d him and 
remarked how 
happy they 
were for 
him. _±
18. They then 
began to 
talk about 
work. _2l
19. They told 
Bill that he 
was the only 
one from the 
office not 
invited to 
the party 
next week, 
which
succeeded in 
puncturing 
Bill's good 
spirits, 
and, in 
fact, he 
felt quite 
left out and 
sad. _z.
20. He couldn't 
help feeling 
that things 
just weren't 
going as 
well as he 
thought they 
would today.
Mention that 
his friends 
were happy 
for him.
Mention of 
the fact that 
they
discussed 
work.
The fact that 
Bill was not 
invited to a 
party, and 
that this 
made him sad 
must be 
present.
Mention that 
Bill starts 
to think 
things aren't 
that good 
anymore.
They made a 
fuss about 
it. They 
were happy 
for him.
They began to 
talk about 
work.
Someone 
brought up 
work.
Bill was sad 
when he found 
out that he 
was not 
invited to 
the office 
party. They 
told him he 
couldn't come 
to the party, 
which upset 
him.
Things were 
getting bad 
for Bill. 
Bill's day 
was getting 
worse. Bill 
didn't like 
the way 
things were 
going.
They asked 
him for a 
loan. They 
got mad 
because they 
DIDN'T win.
They talked 
about the 
weekend.
They asked 
Bill if he 
was going to 
the party. 
Bill found 
out about a 
party and 
wanted to go. 
Bill was glad 
that he 
wasn1t 
invited to 
the work 
party.
Bill still 
thought he 
would have a 
good day. 
Bill thought 
it would all 
pass.
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21. Bill
continued on 
and was soon 
quite
absorbed in 
catching up 
to a woman 
from his 
office. JZl
A sign that He saw a lady Bill saw
Bill tried to 
catch up to 
someone from 
his office.
he worked 
with and 
tried to 
catch up to 
her. Bill 
tried to run 
up to a 
person from 
the office.
another 
friend. Bill 
thought about 
a lady that 
he knew.
22. He walked a 
little 
faster so 
that he 
could catch 
up to her.
&
Mention that 
Bill sped up.
Bill ran up 
to her. He 
scooted up 
along side 
her.
He soon 
caught up to 
her. She 
slowed down 
for him.
23. They said 
hello, and 
Bill felt 
better when 
she told him 
that he 
wasn't the 
only one to 
forget about 
the office 
change. _±
24. Before 
lunch, they 
reached the 
office, and 
Bill's boss 
remarked 
upon how 
foolish he 
was to have 
made such a 
mistake. _z
They found 
out that they 
both went to 
the wrong 
place must be 
present.
Bill's boss 
must make a 
negative 
comment about 
making the 
mistake.
He found out 
they both 
went to the 
old office 
this morning. 
They both 
forgot about 
the office 
change this 
morning. She 
went to the 
wrong office 
this morning 
too.
Bill's boss 
called him 
stupid for 
being late. 
His boss 
laughed at 
bill for 
making such a 
dumb mistake.
He told her 
that he went 
to the wrong 
office this 
morning. She 
' mentioned 
that she 
started to go 
to the wrong 
office, but 
remembered.
Bill's boss 
gave him a 
funny look 
for being 
late. His 
boss was mad 
at him.
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25. Bill
couldn't do 
much except 
to sit there 
and take it, 
but he felt 
very
embarrassed.
Mention that 
Bill was 
embarrassed/f 
elt bad.
Bill felt 
embarrassed, 
Bill felt 
foolish in 
front of 
everyone. 
Bill felt 
helpless as 
his boss 
yelled.
He thought 
his boss was 
a jerk. Bill 
just sat 
there (no 
implication 
that he felt 
bad)
26. He then sat 
down at his 
desk and 
started to 
work.
An indication 
that Bill got 
on with his 
work.
So Bill 
started to 
work. Bill 
got to work,
Bill took a 
break. Bill 
didn't want 
to work 
anymore.
27. The other 
workers 
laughed and 
teased Bill,
Anything 
indicating 
Bill was 
teased.
Some of the 
others 
laughed at 
Bill. People 
ridiculed 
him.
They laughed 
with Bill 
about his 
mistake.
28. ..but then An indication The other Bill wished
stopped , that the workers knew the others
since they other workers he was a good knew how hard
all admired admired is worker. They he works.
his vigor work. stopped The others
and energy teasing him stopped and
at work. _J; because he went back to
does their work.
excellent
work.
29. They knew An indication They Bill just
he was a that his co­ apologized to worked
good workers Bill for harder. The
employee, admired him laughing. others soon
and some of in some way, They new he stopped and
them and were worked hard, got to work.
apologized sorry for and felt bad
to him for laughing. for teasing
laughing. + him.
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30. Soon it was 
lunchtime 
and Bill 
sent out for 
a corned 
beef
sandwich on 
rye . _2l
31. he was 
frustrated 
when the 
delivery man 
brought him 
Swiss cheese 
on white 
bread. _n
32. "What 
terrible 
luck," 
thought 
Bill.
33. ..but then 
he put it 
out of his 
mind and sat 
back in his 
desk chair 
to look over 
the office 
with a 
contented 
feeling of 
having done 
his job 
well. _+
34 . He really 
did like his 
job, and it 
made him 
realize that 
some of the 
bad things 
that had 
happened 
weren't all 
that
terrible. _±
The fact that 
Bill ordered 
a corned beef 
sandwich must 
be present.
The fact that 
Bill receives 
a sandwich 
other than 
the one 
ordered must 
be present.
Something 
about Bill's 
bad luck must 
be present.
An indication 
that Bill 
knew he had 
done a good 
job.
An indication 
that Bill 
realized that 
things 
weren't as 
bad as 
before.
Bill sent out 
for a corned 
beef sandwich 
for lunch.
Bill got the
wrong
sandwich.
They sent a
baloney
sandwich
instead.
"Just my 
luck," he 
thought. I'm 
so unlucky 
today.
Bill sat back 
and thought 
about how 
good a job he 
had done.
Bill was 
pleased with 
the work he 
had
accomplished. 
Bill was 
proud of the 
work he had 
done.
The rest of 
his day went 
fine. He 
didn't think 
things were 
all that bad. 
Bill liked 
his job and 
forgot about 
the bad 
things that 
happened 
today.
Bill ate a 
sandwich for 
lunch. Bill 
ordered a ham 
and cheese 
sandwich for 
lunch.
Bill got his 
sandwich. 
Bill's order 
came late.
He didn't 
like his 
lunch.
"Oh well," he 
thought. It 
wasn't a bad 
sandwich.
Bill sat back 
and relaxed. 
He was
excited that 
his day was 
almost over. 
Bill finished 
all the work 
that he had 
to do that 
day.
Bill liked 
his job.
Bill made it 
through the 
day.
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35. When it was 
time to 
leave work, 
Bill
remembered 
that he had 
to stop and 
get some 
groceries.
&
35. However, 
when he got 
there the 
store had 
just closed 
and Bill 
couldn't get 
in.  n
37. Bill's luck 
changed, 
however, 
because the 
clerk saw 
him and let 
in to buy 
the couple 
of things 
that he 
needed. _±
38. On the way 
home Bill 
walked down 
a long dark 
street,
39. and man 
came up to 
him and beat 
him over the 
head.
Mention that 
Bill had to 
go to the 
store on the 
way home.
Mention that 
the store was 
closed so he 
couldn't get 
his things.
Mention that 
someone let 
him in 
anyway.
Any
indication 
that Bill was 
walking down 
a dark 
street.
An indication 
that Bill was 
beaten or 
mugged.
Bill went to 
the store on 
the way home 
He stopped 
off for some 
groceries.
But the store 
was closed. 
The store 
wasn't open 
when he got 
there.
The store 
owner
unlocked the 
door for him. 
He was 
allowed in.
After work 
Bill walked 
down a dark 
street. The 
street Bill 
walked home 
on was long 
and dark.
A man beat 
him up. Bill 
was hit over 
the head.
Bill was 
attacked.
Bill went 
home.
They were out 
of his items. 
He got there 
just before 
they closed.
Bill snuck in 
the store.
He went to a 
different 
store.
Bill walked 
down a long 
street. Bill 
walked home.
Bill was 
robbed. He 
saw someone 
getting beat 
up on the way 
home.
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40. Bill ran 
away as fast 
as he could 
in fear for 
his life. _z.
41. After a 
while he 
slowed down 
to catch his 
breath, _£[
42. and when he 
got home he 
felt much 
better. _+
43. He was met 
at the door 
by his wife, 
whom he 
loved very 
much. _+
44. When he saw 
her, he 
broke into a 
smile, 
relieved to 
be home, and 
said, "I've 
got a lot to 
tell you, 
about what 
happened to 
me today,"_+
45. ..and began 
to tell his 
story. _0.
Mention that 
Bill fled in 
fear.
Indication 
that the 
danger was 
over and Bill 
could rest.
An indication 
that he felt 
better upon 
arriving 
home.
The fact that 
he loves or 
likes his 
wife must be 
mentioned in 
some form.
Mention of 
the fact that 
he smiled, 
and says that 
he has a lot 
to tell her.
An indication 
that he 
started to 
tell about 
his day.
Bill was 
scared and 
ran away.
Bill got out 
of there as 
fast as he 
could.
Bill rested 
after a 
while. He 
stopped for a 
breath.
He was happy 
to get home. 
He was 
relieved to 
finally get 
home.
His wife, 
whom he 
loves, met 
him at the 
door. He 
loved his 
wife and was 
happy to see 
her home.
He smiled at 
her, saying 
that he has 
something to 
tell her. "I 
have a lot to 
tell you," he 
said smiling.
He then 
proceeded to 
tell her what 
happened.
Bill told her 
about his
Bill got 
away.
He ran all 
the way home. 
Bill couldn't 
stop for a 
break.
Bill made it 
home. When 
Bill got home 
he sat down 
and relaxed.
His wife met 
him at the 
door (without 
mention that 
he loves 
her) . Bill1s 
wife was 
there to 
greet him.
He wanted to 
tell her 
about his 
day. He was 
very upset, 
saying "I've 
got a lot to 
tell you."
He was glad 
to be home. 
His day was 
over. The 
end.
day.
Appendix G
Scoring Criteria for Susan's Day 
Element. Needed E&aJOQRJLSfi
1. Susan woke 
up very 
excited 
because 
today she 
was going on 
a picnic 
with some 
friends. __±
2. She went 
into the 
kitchen and 
began
preparing a 
special dish 
to bring 
along to the 
picnic.
3. After 
putting it 
in the oven 
Susan got 
dressed in 
her new 
outfit, and 
was very 
pleased with 
the way it 
looked on 
her. _+
4. An hour 
later she 
realized 
that she was 
running 
late,
An indication 
that Susan 
was in a good 
mood.
Mention of 
the fact that 
Susan was to 
prepare food 
to bring 
along.
Any
indication 
that Susan 
was pleased 
with the way 
she looked in 
her outfit.
Mention that 
Susan was 
late .
Susan was 
looking 
forward to a 
picnic.
Today Susan 
was excited 
because. . . 
Susan was 
happy 
because.. .
Susan started 
to make 
something to 
bring. Susan 
got the food 
she needed to 
bring along.
Susan liked 
the way her 
outfit 
looked.
Susan thought 
she looked 
good. Susan 
was pleased 
with her 
outfit.
Susan was 
behind 
schedule.
She had to 
hurry because 
she was late.
Hot
Acceptable
Susan was 
going on a 
picnic.
Susan woke 
u p .
Susan went 
into the 
kitchen to 
eat
breakfast.
She went to 
the store to 
get some 
food.
Susan got 
dressed.
Susan didn't 
have any nice 
clothes to 
wear.
She was ready 
in an hour. 
She.took an 
hour to get 
ready to g o .
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5. so she 
quickly got 
her things 
together and 
ran into the 
kitchen to 
get her 
casserole. 0
6. She then 
discovered 
that she had 
forgotten to 
turn the 
oven on. _±
7. "How stupid 
I am!" she 
thought, and 
was very mad 
at herself.
8, She called a 
delicatessen 
and ordered 
sandwiches 
instead, _J2
9. but when she 
got there 
they had 
forgotten 
her order.
10. The
delicatessen 
apologized, 
and ended up 
giving her 
the
sandwiches 
for free. +
An indication 
that she was 
preparing to 
leave.
The fact that 
Susan forgot 
to turn the 
oven on must 
be mentioned.
An indication 
that Susan 
was upset at 
herself.
The fact that 
Susan ordered 
out for food 
must be 
present.
An indication 
that her 
order had not 
been filled. 
Not ready yet 
is not 
acceptable.
Anything 
indicating 
that she got 
the food for 
free as 
compensation.
She started 
getting her 
things 
together.
She went to 
get her food
Susan never 
turned the 
oven on . The 
heat in the 
stove wasn't 
o n .
She called 
herself 
stupid. She 
was mad at 
herself for 
doing it.
Susan called 
the store to 
order 
something 
instead.
Susan had a 
deli make 
something 
instead.
The store 
never made 
the
sandwiches. 
They lost her 
order.
They gave her 
the
sandwiches
and
apologized. 
She didn't 
have to pay 
for them.
She ran to 
the car. She 
rushed off.
The food 
wasn't cooked 
yet. She 
burned the 
meal. She 
forgot to 
prepare the 
food.
Susan laughed 
at her 
stupidity. 
"Oh, well." 
she thought.
Susan quickly 
made some 
sandwiches.
The
sandwiches 
weren't ready 
yet. She had 
to wait for 
her order.
She got her 
sandwiches 
and left (No 
indication of 
payment or 
lack of it).
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11. Susan got 
in her car 
and headed 
for the 
picnic.
1 2 . On the way 
Susan
noticed how 
the sun was 
shining and 
thought, 
"This is a 
beautiful 
day, "
smiling in 
anticipation 
±
13. Apparently 
many other 
people had 
the same 
idea because 
it took over 
45 minutes 
to find a 
parking 
spot. _z.
14. She soon 
found one 
and headed 
off to look 
for her 
friends. _J2
15. She had a 
long way to 
walk, and 
ended up at 
the wrong 
end of the 
park. __n
Mention of 
the fact that 
Susan was on 
her way.
Recognition 
that Susan 
was pleased 
that it was a 
beautiful 
day.
An indication 
that it took 
her a long 
time co park 
because it 
was crowded.
Mention that 
she did 
eventually 
find a place 
to park.
Some
indication 
that Susan 
was not in 
the right 
place.
Susan started 
off again. 
Susan got 
back on the 
road.
Susan thought 
it was a nice 
day. The sun 
was shining 
which made 
her happy. 
Susan smiled 
because of 
the good 
weather.
Susan
couldn't find 
a place to 
park. There 
were no 
parking 
places left. 
It took her 
forever to 
find a place 
to park.
She found a 
spot and got 
out. She 
finally got a 
place and 
headed for 
the picnic.
She went to 
the wrong 
picnic area. 
She got lost 
on the way.
Susan went 
back home. 
Susan didn't 
want to go, 
but did any 
way.
Susan was 
happy. There 
was good 
weather (no 
mention of 
Susan
recognizing 
this).
She drove up 
and parked.
She never 
found a spot 
and went 
home.
She couldn't 
find anyone 
(no mention 
that she was 
in the wrong 
place).
Susan had 
trouble 
getting to 
her friends.
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16.She saw
someone that 
she knew, 
and was 
pleased to 
find out 
that he had 
made the 
same mistake 
as she did,
+
17. so the two 
of them 
headed off 
for the rest 
of the 
group. _0.
18. On the way 
some boys 
playing 
football 
knocked her 
down, _r.
19. causing her 
to scrape 
her knee 
rather 
badly. _r.
20. She sat 
there for 
awhile quite 
upset and in 
a lot of 
pain. _r.
21. After 
resting she 
got up and 
continued on 
her way. _jg
Mention of 
the fact that 
she saw a 
friend who 
had made the 
same error, 
plus that 
this relieved 
her in some 
way.
An indication 
that the two 
of them 
headed for 
their 
friends.
"knocked 
down" by 
someone else 
in any form 
must be 
mentioned.
An indication 
that Susan 
injured 
herself.
Recognition 
that she was 
in pain.
An indication 
that Susan 
kept on 
going.
She was glad 
when she 
found a 
friend who 
had done the 
same thing. 
She met 
someone else 
who was in 
the same 
predicament, 
which made 
Susan feel 
better.
So they took 
off for the 
picnic. They 
walked the 
rest of the 
way together.
■ Some guys 
knocked her 
over. Susan 
was ran into 
and fell.
She twisted 
her ankle 
(scrapped her 
leg, stubbed 
a toe).
Susan was 
hurt when she 
fell.
She was 
really hurt. 
She was mad 
and hurt.
She got up 
and headed 
for her 
friends. 
This didn't 
stop her.
Someone 
showed her 
the way. She 
saw a friend 
who pointed 
out where the 
picnic was.
They said 
goodbye and 
left. They 
spent the day 
alone.
Susan tripped 
(fell, 
slipped, 
stumbled).
Susan got up 
and went on 
her way. 
causing her 
to drop her 
things.
Susan brushed 
herself off. 
Susan got up 
and shook it 
off.
She got 
frustrated 
and just sat 
there. She 
wanted to go 
home.
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22. Her friend 
happened to 
have some 
bandages, so 
he patched 
her up and 
made her 
feel a whole 
lot better.
+
23. Her 
frustration 
passed when 
she reached 
her friends 
because it 
felt good to 
see them all 
together. _+
24. Susan
noticed that 
people were 
playing 
softball and 
wanted to 
play. _j2
25. There were 
too many 
people, 
though, and 
Susan didn't 
get picked 
to be on a 
team which 
made her 
feel kind of 
worthless.
26. Susan sat 
and watched 
for a while, 
0
Mention that 
her injury 
was attended 
to, making 
her feel 
better.
Anything 
indicating 
that seeing 
her friends 
made Susan 
feel better
Mention of 
the fact that 
Susan wanted 
to join in 
some group 
activity.
"Susan was 
left out" in 
some form.
Ment ion that 
Susan sat to 
watch the 
others play.
She cleaned 
herself up 
and felt 
better. Her 
friend gave 
her some 
bandages and 
the pain went 
away.
She was happy 
to finally 
reach her 
friends. She 
forgot about 
the trouble 
when she got 
to the 
picnic.
She tried to 
get in on a 
game. Susan 
wanted to 
play some 
games with 
the others.
No one wanted 
to play with 
her. Susan 
didn't get to 
be on a team. 
Nobody picked 
Susan to 
play.
She watched 
instead.
She was 
gushing blood 
all over 
everything 
(sorry, 
couldn't 
resist!).
She limped 
off for the 
group.
After a while 
Susan forgot 
what had 
happened 
(without the 
context of 
her friends). 
It took a 
long time to 
get over what 
had happened.
Susan saw the 
others 
playing a 
game. Susan 
wanted to 
play a game 
but no one 
else did.
She decided 
not to play. 
Susan 
couldn't 
play. There 
wasn't time 
to get 
involved.
She went off 
by herself.
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27. until 
someone got 
tired and 
asked her to 
take his 
place, which 
made her 
happy. _+
28. During the 
game she 
made some 
mistakes, 
and felt 
foolish. _z.
29. She also 
felt that 
some of her 
friends were 
cruel
because they 
laughed at 
her for 
making some 
mistakes, _n
30. but after 
the game 
they all 
complimented 
her for 
being a good 
sport and 
trying her 
best. _±
31. After the 
game
everyone ate 
lunch. 0
Somebody lets 
Susan join 
in.
"Felt
foolish" for 
her play in 
some form 
must be 
there.
The fact that 
Susan was 
ridiculed 
must be 
mentioned.
Susan is 
recognized 
for trying 
hard and/or 
being a good 
sport.
Pretty self 
explanatory.
A guy asked 
Susan to be 
on his team 
Someone got 
hurt and 
asked Susan 
to fill in.
Susan wasn't 
very good, 
and got 
embarrassed. 
Susan made a 
lot of errors 
and felt bad.
Susan wasn't 
very good, 
and the 
others 
laughed at 
her. Someone 
made fun of 
Susan's 
ability.
After the 
game someone 
said she was 
a good sport 
about it.
They all knew 
she was 
trying her 
best, and 
told her.
They started 
eating. It 
was
lunchtime.
Susan started 
another game. 
She just 
watched. She 
thought she 
could play 
the next 
game.
She played 
well.
Susan's team 
wasn't very 
good. She 
didn't worry 
about her few 
errors.
Susan wasn't 
very good.
She made some 
mistakes. 
Susan was 
embarrassed 
at the way 
she played.
Susan felt 
that she had 
tried hard. 
She was a 
good sport 
about it, 
though.
They went 
hunting.
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32. Susan got 
embarrassed 
when she had 
to tell 
people why 
she brought 
deli
sandwiches,
33. but
everybody 
said they 
were good, 
and thanked 
her for 
bringing 
them. +
34. At the end 
of the day 
Susan got 
excited when 
a man that 
she really 
liked walked 
her to her 
car. _±
35. On the way 
he asked her 
out on a 
date which 
made her 
very happy.
+
36. They made 
plans to get 
together 
soon, and 
said
goodbye. _j2
Mention that 
she was 
embarrassed 
for having to 
bring deli 
sandwiches.
Recognition 
that the 
others 
enjoyed the 
sandwiches 
and
appreciated 
it.
A man that 
she likes 
walks her to 
her car.
Both being 
asked out on 
a date must 
be present.
An indication 
that she 
left.
She felt dumb 
for having to 
bring the 
sandwiches. 
Susan
admitted why 
she had to 
bring store 
food.
They liked 
the
sandwiches. 
Nobody was 
upset at it . 
They all 
thanked her 
for bringing 
them along.
A guy Susan 
thought was 
cute walked 
her to her 
car. A man 
she liked 
carried her 
things for 
her.
She was happy 
that he asked 
her out on a 
date. She 
got excited 
when he asked 
her out for 
the coming 
weekend.
She got on 
the road.
She said 
'yes' and 
left. They 
said goodbye.
Nobody said 
anything 
about her 
sandwiches.
They teased 
her about 
them. Nobody 
ate her food.
Someone 
helped her to 
her car. A 
friend/girl 
walked Susan 
to her car.
She wished he 
would ask her 
out. She 
asked him 
out. He 
asked if her 
friend would 
go out with 
him.
They went 
home
together. He 
left. She 
stupidly sat 
in her car 
for hours.
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37. On the way 
home she 
couldn't 
stop
thinking 
about what a 
great day it 
was, and was 
very pleased 
with the way 
things went. 
+
Mention that 
Susan felt 
good about 
the day.
Susan
realized what 
a great day 
it was. She 
thought how 
fun the day 
went.
Susan thought 
about the day 
(no
happiness). 
The day 
sucked.
38. Her
excitement 
was■ruined, 
however, 
when a 
policeman 
pulled her 
over and 
gave her a 
speeding 
ticket. _r
It must be 
mentioned 
that she 
received a 
traffic 
ticket.
Susan got a 
ticket on the 
way home.
She was 
caught 
speeding in 
her car.
A policeman 
sold her a 
ticket to the 
policemen's 
ball. She 
pulled over 
to let a 
police car 
by.
39. Susan 
realized 
that she 
wasn1t 
paying much 
attention to 
her driving, 
and got 
upset at 
herself for 
it. _n
An indication 
that Susan 
got upset at 
herself.
Susan got mad 
about her 
driving. She 
new it was 
her fault for 
speeding.
She couldn't 
believe the 
cop gave her 
a ticket.
40. She finally 
made it 
home,
though, and 
sat down to 
relax. 0
Anything 
indicating 
that she got 
home.
She made it 
home. When 
she got 
home... "I'm 
finally 
home.," she 
thought. She 
watched TV 
when she got 
home.
She went to a 
friends home. 
She went to a 
movie.
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41. Her cat let 
out a loud 
"Meow" and 
jumped up on 
Susan's lap. 
0.
42. Susan loved 
her cat, and 
felt really 
good when it 
began to 
purr in her 
arms. _+
43. As she 
began to pet 
her cat she 
realized 
that he felt 
wet, and 
started to 
look around. 
£
44. "Oh, No! 
This is 
terrible!" 
she cried 
out when she 
saw that the 
cat had 
knocked over 
a $100.00 
crystal vase 
that had 
flowers in 
it.
45. After 
cleaning it 
up she sat 
down and 
thought 
about what a 
strange day 
it had been. 
0
Mention that 
Susan has a 
cat.
Recognition 
that Susan 
really 
enjoyed her 
cat.
"The cat felt 
wet" in some 
form must be 
present.
Mention that 
an expensive 
vase was 
broken.
Susan must 
think about 
the day's 
events.
Susan's cat 
came into the 
room. Her 
cat met her 
at the door.
Petting the 
cat made her 
feel good. 
Susan loved 
that animal. 
She really 
loved her 
little 
companion.
The cat was 
damp. The 
cat was 
soaking w et.
A $100 dollar 
vase was 
knocked over. 
An expensive 
vase was 
broken on the 
floor. A 
crystal vase 
was cracked.
"What a day" 
she said 
(thought, 
cried, 
sighed, 
laughed).
Her
rhinoceros 
jumped on her 
lap. Susan's 
dog meowed.
She didn't 
want to be 
bothered by 
it right now 
The cat got 
on her 
nerves.
The cat was 
covered in 
flour.
The cat 
knocked some 
stuff over 
(no expense). 
The cat broke 
a picture 
frame.
The End.
That was the 
end of her 
day. She 
thought about 
the next day.
Footnotes
^Beck (1967) has defined the schema (pi - schemata) as "a 
cognitive structure for screening, coding, and evaluating the 
stimuli that impinge on the organism. It is the mode by 
which the environment is broken down and organized into its 
many psychologically relevant facets" (p. 283). Negative 
self-schemata, therefore, are cognitive structures containing 
a negative view of the self. Upon activation of the self­
schema the individual's thoughts and behaviors that relate in 
some way to the self are governed by its negative (or 
positive) view.
2it should be noted that both the imagery and cognitive 
instructions were adapted from Guthrie (1984). Hart and 
Means added a paragraph to the cognitive set and converted 
the questions in Guthrie’s cognitive instructions to 
statements.
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